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I. Introduction 
 
John Smith1 worked as a scientist for a large pharmaceutical company in the suburbs north of 
Philadelphia.  In mid-March 2003, on his way home from work one evening, he stepped out of the 
commuter train station into anyone’s worse nightmare.  As he walked to his car from the station, he was 
hit over the head with a cinderblock by a robber.  The assailant robbed John not only of his cash but of the 
soundness of his mind. 
The attack placed John in a coma.  He awoke a few weeks later to a life he did not know.  His 
memory faded in and out.  His fears were significant.  He could no longer function in his job.  He slowly 
recovered his physical strength but not his full cognitive abilities.  Unmarried and without any close 
family, John had no one to take full care of him.  Although friends aided him during the recovery, no one 
person knew everything about him or took complete control to address everything that needed to be done. 
John failed to file his 2002 return which came due while he was in a coma.  He never realized his 
failure.  Likewise, he failed to file his 2003 return which included his first few months of salary in 
addition to several months of sick leave and severance pay.  The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
eventually sent John letters notifying him of his failure to file the returns.  Like so much correspondence 
John received, he did not know what to do with the letters and failed to respond.  The IRS eventually used 
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the substitute for return procedures to determine his liability, sent him notices of deficiency, and when he 
did not petition the Tax Court assessed against John the proposed liabilities.  The IRS sent John the 
customary and appropriate collection notices including the collection due process notice informing him of 
its intent to levy on his assets if he did not address the unpaid taxes. 
While unable to deal with the IRS correspondence due to his mental disability caused by the 
injury, John did receive assistance in applying for Social Security disability.  He began receiving 
disability payments in 2005.   Prior to receiving the disability determination, the entirety of John’s 
savings was used up on medical bills and normal life expenses.  Unable to afford his house any longer, he 
moved into an apartment.  The disability payments allowed him to pay the rent, purchase food, and pay 
his substantial ongoing medical expenses, but with nothing left over. 
After running through its correspondence stream with no response from John, the IRS began 
levying on his Social Security disability payments in 2007, taking 15% each month.  The levy placed 
John in a hardship position because he could no longer afford the drugs he needed or food and other 
necessities.  He wrote to the IRS attempting to explain his problem.  His letter was difficult for the IRS to 
understand and John did not respond to further inquiries from the IRS because of his diminished 
comprehension abilities. 
Almost three years after the IRS began levying on his Social Security benefits, a friend brought 
John to the Villanova Tax Clinic seeking help in working with the IRS to remove or reduce the levy.  The 
clinic requested that the IRS stop the levy because it placed John in a hardship situation.  At first the 
clinic received some resistance because John had not filed returns.  At almost the same time the clinic 
took up the case, the Tax Court ruled that the failure to file returns did not override the statutory language 
concerning levies placing taxpayers in hardship situations.2  The clinic next looked to determine whether 
it could reduce or eliminate the underlying liability.  John had no records, no memory and liabilities 
which were quite old.  So, the clinic moved on to seeking relief through collection alternatives.  It also 
sought the return of the Social Security payments that the IRS received through its levy because the loss 
of those funds placed John in a hardship situation.  Section 6343 permits the return of funds in this 
situation; however, it allows for the refund of funds wrongfully levied only in the previous nine months.3  
The effect of the limitation on recovery meant that John could only receive 25% of the amount taken from 
him by levy at a time when the levy created a hardship and he lacked capacity to contest the levy due to 
his financial disability.4   
The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “Code”) contains a number of strict time limitations with 
which financially disabled taxpayers are unable to comply.  In 1998, Congress addressed financial 
disability within the Code by creating a basis for suspending the statute of limitations for refund claims by 
taxpayers facing such disability.5  This suspension of the limitations period for the financially disabled, 
however, only applies to individuals seeking a refund of taxes.  The provision does not extend to provide 
relief to the circumstances faced by John, nor does it apply to a number of other situations faced by 
financially disabled taxpayers. 
Although John’s story provides an extreme example of taxpayer disability, a large number of 
taxpayers face financial disabilities that greatly impact their ability to comply with the strict time 
                                                     
2 See Vinatieri v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 392 (2009); see also I.R.C. § 6343. 
3 All references and citations to sections hereinafter are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
as amended, unless otherwise indicated.  Section 6343(d) allows the IRS to return funds wrongfully 
levied; Section 6343(b) limits the amount of recovery to only amounts wrongfully levied upon only in the 
previous nine months.  See I.R.C. § 6343(b), (d). 
4 The fraction twenty-five percent represents the recovery of nine out of thirty-six months of levy on his 
disability payments.  The term financial disability will be discussed at length below.  It is a term taken 
from section 6511 of the Code. 
5 See I.R.C. § 6511(h). 
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limitations imposed by the Code.  This paper argues that the concept of financial disability deserves 
broader application to allow those afflicted by financial disability to obtain an extension of the statute of 
limitations in circumstances beyond requests for refund.  It also examines the definition of financial 
disability in light of almost fifteen years of experience with the language, and proposes expansion of the 
language to encompass circumstances other than those allowed by the current statute. 
Part II of this article provides background by reviewing the two cases, United States v. 
Brockamp6 and Webb v. United States,7 which led to the adoption of the financial disability provision in 
1998.  Part III of this article examines the legislative history of the current financial disability statute, 
Section 6511(h), and its scope.  Part IV explores three other provisions within the Code that allow for the 
suspension of time limitations.  This Part also discusses additional circumstances that give rise to 
financial disability and propose expansion of the definition of financial disability in the statute.  Part V of 
this article offers a proposed legislative solution, drawing upon features of current statutes and IRS 
authority and outlining the correct circumstances in which tolling should occur.  Finally, Part VI sets out 
conclusions. 
 
II. Background of Financial Disability 
 
The relief provisions for financial disability in the IRC came into existence primarily in response 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in the pivotal case United States v. Brockamp.  The request for relief in 
Brockamp occurred as a result of the Supreme Court opening the door to assertions of equitable tolling 
against the federal government in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs.8  Mr. Irwin was fired from his 
job at the Department of Veterans Affairs.  He filed a complaint with the Veterans Administration, 
alleging that he was fired because of his race and disability, and lost.  He appealed that determination to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and lost.  The EEOC sent him a notice of its 
determination, after which he had thirty days to file a complaint in the United States District Court.  Irwin 
failed to timely file his complaint, in part due to late receipt of the notice by him personally and in part 
due to the fact that his attorney was overseas when the notice came into the attorney’s office. 
At the trial and appellate levels, the Government succeeded in arguing that compliance with the 
statute of limitations was a requirement for waiving sovereign immunity.  Because Irwin failed to meet 
this condition, his complaint was barred due to lack of jurisdiction.  Instead of deciding the case on this 
jurisdictional ground, the Supreme Court noted that it had ruled inconsistently in this area previously and 
chose this case “to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits 
against the Government.”9  The Court stated that equitable tolling ordinarily applies to time requirements 
in suits against private litigants, specifying that equitable tolling also applies in private suits under Title 
VII.  It then concluded that “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits 
against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.”10 
                                                     
6 United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997) 
7 Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997) 
8 498 U.S. 89 (1991).  Equitable tolling of time frames in federal statues will be discussed briefly below in 
Section IV.  For a detailed discussion of this issue, see the following articles, written by Professor Carlton 
Smith of Cardozo Law School: Carlton M. Smith, Cracks Appear in the Code’s ‘Jurisdictional’ Time 
Provisions, TAX NOTES 511 (October 29, 2012); Carlton M. Smith, Friedland: Did the Tax Court Blow its 
Whistleblower Jurisdiction?, TAX NOTES 843 (May 23, 2011), Doc 2011-9435, 2011 TNT 100-10; 
Carlton M. Smith, Equitably Tolling Innocent Souse and Collection Due Process Periods, TAX NOTES 
1106 (Mar. 1 2010), Doc 2010-3161, 2010 TNT 41-8. 
9 See id. at 97. 
10 See id. at 97-98.  Unfortunately for Mr. Irwin, the Court went on to find that his circumstances did not 
merit equitable tolling. 
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This holding created hope for litigants whose actions against the United States did not meet 
statutory time frames and whose cases were previously subject to motions to dismiss on jurisdictional 
grounds.  Even though the Supreme Court went out of its way in Irwin to announce a clarifying rule in a 
case that did not merit equitable tolling, the clarity the Court sought to bring with the ruling was undercut 
by a decision it had rendered in the previous year11 and was soon to be tested against federal tax 
provisions. 
 
A. Discussion of Webb 
 
Three days prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brockamp, the Fourth Circuit had decided a 
case that also involved equitable tolling.12  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit did not find that 
Section 6511 contained an implied exception permitting equitable tolling.  The Webb case involved Mary 
Morton Parsons, born in Richmond, Virginia in 1902 the only child of a very wealthy family.13  She lived 
a life sheltered from concerns about finances relying on her parents, then her husband, and then her sister-
in-law to manage her financial issues.  By 1972 all of the individuals upon whom she had relied for 
advice had passed away.  She placed her trust in Dr. Alvin Q. Jarrett, her personal physician and a social 
acquaintance, and he soon proved that her trust was misplaced.14  Dr. Jarrett teamed with tax attorney 
Roland Freasier, Jr. to essentially take all of her money: 
Through systematic physical and emotional abuse during the ensuing fourteen years, 
Jarrett and Freasier induced Parsons to relinquish to them total control over her day to 
day affairs.  They persuaded her to move into virtual seclusion in Virginia Beach, 
Virginia, where they confined her to her bed under heavy sedation.  They discharged 
most of Parsons’ household staff and prevented her from receiving mail or telephone 
calls and from seeing visitors.  They also induced her to grant to each of them powers of 
attorney, thus enabling them to manipulate her financial affairs for their own benefit.15 
As they stole her money, Jarrett and Freasier filed a gift tax return reporting the transfers of funds from 
her to each of them, their spouses, and their children.  In 1987 Mrs. Parsons finally loosened their grip on 
her with the help of an old friend and discovered the fraudulent transfers.  She brought suit in state court 
against Jarrett and Freasier to recover her money and filed a refund claim with the IRS seeking the return 
                                                     
11 See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990). 
12 See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1148 (1997). 
13 See Webb, 66 F.3d at 691. 
14 See Best Rip-Off Artists in Richmond History, STYLE WEEKLY, 
http://www.styleweekly.com/richmond/best-rip-off-artists-in-richmond-history/BestOf?oid=1463690 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2012) (Richmond news magazine selecting Dr. Jarrett and his accomplice, tax attorney 
Roland B. Freasier, Jr., the “Best Rip-Off Artists in Richmond History”).  The details of the case are best 
traced in a series of articles by the Richmond Times Dispatch that span a decade.  ELLIOTT COOPER, 
Physician Says Widow’s Suit Against Him is too Sweeping, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, January 12, 
1988; Service for Philanthropist Mrs. Parsons Conducted, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, August 28, 1990; 
RANDOLPH GOODE, Estate Files $16.8 Million Lawsuit Against U.S. Claim Seeks Nonrefunded Gift 
Taxes Plus Interest, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, December 18, 1993; RANDOLPH GOODE, Lawsuit 
Seeking Return of ’80 Gift Taxes Dismissed Parsons Estate Asked for Return of $11 Million, RICHMOND 
TIMES DISPATCH, May 6, 1994; and BILL MCKELWAY, A Quiet Man of Influence: Loved and Feared, His 
Links to Old Money Have Made Him a Midas – Yet Few Know His Name, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, 
September 20, 1998.   
15 See Webb, 66 F.3d at 692. 
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of the gift taxes paid under circumstances in which no gift existed.  Her suit against Jarrett and Freasier 
succeeded while her suit against the IRS did not.16   
Under Section 6511, which governs refund claims, a taxpayer must file such claim from the later 
of three years from the time the return was filed, or two years from the time the tax was paid.17  The IRS 
accepted the basis for Mrs. Parsons’s claim for refund and refunded gift tax payments made within the 
statutory time frame prior to her claim.  The IRS, however, denied her refund claim on gift taxes paid 
more than three years before the filing of her refund claim taking the position that these claims for gift 
taxes paid were barred by the statute of limitations.   
 Her estate brought suit arguing that under the circumstances of this case the statute of limitations 
for filing a refund claim was equitably tolled, citing Irwin as support.  The district court dismissed the 
case for lack of jurisdiction.18  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that “[i]f this case had arisen prior to 
1990, there would seemingly be no question that the district court’s holding was correct.”19  The Fourth 
Circuit engaged in a lengthy analysis of Irwin before deciding that Irwin did not create equitable tolling in 
a suit for the refund of taxes.  “Crucial to the Supreme Court’s holding in Irwin, that equitable tolling 
applies in suits under Title VII against the United States was the fact that ‘the statutory time limits 
applicable to lawsuits against private employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling’ 498 U.S. 
at 95.”20 Because tax refund suits have no comparable private remedy and because the tax refund statute 
went to such lengths to make clear the jurisdictional nature of the statute, equitable tolling could not hold 
open the statute of limitations for Mrs. Parson’s multimillion dollar claim even though the equities in her 
case were quite compelling. 
 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Webb.21  All other circuits considering the issue found 
that IRC 6511 did not authorize equitable tolling.22 
 
B. Discussion of Brockamp  
 
Driven by the same language in Irwin that inspired the Webb case, two cases made their way to 
the Ninth Circuit at precisely the same time.23  These two cases, Brockamp and Scott, were consolidated 
                                                     
16 See Randolph Goode, Estate Files $16.8 Million Lawsuit Against U.S. Claim Seeks Nonrefunded Gift 
Taxes Plus Interest, Richmond Times Dispatch, December 18, 1993; Randolph Goode, Lawsuit Seeking 
Return of ’80 Gift Taxes Dismissed, Richmond Times Dispatch, May 6, 1994 (noting that Jarrett and 
Freasier transferred much of the stock back to Ms. Parsons); see also Best Rip-Off Artists in Richmond 
History, Style Weekly (listing Jarrett and Freasier first on a list of rip off artists in Richmond).  This series 
of newspaper articles recounts the actions taken by Jarrett and Freasier as well as the ultimate disposition 
of her case. 
17 See I.R.C. §  6511(a). 
18 850 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Va. 1994) 
19 Webb, 66 F.3d at 694. 
20 Webb, 66 F.3d at 696. 
21 Petition for certiorari filed Feb. 23, 1996 (No. 95-1360).  Cert. denied 519 U.S. 1148 (February 24, 
1997) 
22 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1996); Lovett v. United States, 81 F.3d 
143 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993) (per curiam); and Vintilla v. 
United States, 931 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1991). 
23 See, e.g., Brockamp v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1283 (C.D. Cal. 1994), rev’d, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 
1995); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Haw. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), judgt. 
order reported at 70 F.3d 120 (1995) (the cases were consolidated for opinion at the Ninth Circuit). 
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for opinion in the Ninth Circuit.  While the Brockamp case has received more attention, the second case, 
Scott v. United States,24 also deserves mention.  Mr. Scott held a lawyer’s license in California before he 
lost it and many other things due to alcoholism.  For the tax year 1984, his father, acting with a power of 
attorney, deposited over $30,000 with the IRS as estimated payments.  Mr. Scott’s father terminated the 
power of attorney before filing the 1984 return.  The filing of this return finally occurred in November 
1989, long after the period for claiming a refund had expired.  The return sought a refund of the entire 
amount of estimated payments deposited in 1984.  The district court determined that Mr. Scott’s 
alcoholism rendered him mentally incompetent during the entire period between the due date for the 1984 
return and the filing of the late return.  The court held that the refund period was equitably tolled, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
In the Brockamp case, Marian Brockamp was appointed to administer the estate of her father, 
Stanley B. McGill.  Mr. McGill, a brilliant mathematician during his working years, sent an estimated 
payment to the IRS for 1984 of $7,000 when requesting an extension to file but never filed the return for 
that year.  At the time of filing the request for extension, Mr. McGill was 93 and suffering from some 
symptoms of dementia.  He passed away in 1988 at the age of 98.  Ms. Brockamp realized in reviewing 
his estate that her father had not filed a tax return for 1984.  She prepared and filed the 1984 return which 
showed a liability of only $427.  When the IRS did not refund the balance, she brought suit.  The district 
court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction due to the late filing of the return as a refund claim.  The 
Ninth Circuit consolidated the Brockamp case with the Scott case.  Relying on Irwin, it found that 
equitable tolling applies to refund claims in both cases because of the mental condition of each taxpayer 
at the time the statute of limitation on filing the refund claim passed. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that some language in Irwin could support equitable tolling in 
the refund context, but determined that it could “travel no further, however, along Irwin’s road, for there 
are strong reasons for answering Irwin’s question in the Government’s favor.”25  The Court noted that 
“[s]ection 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form.”26  It determined that the highly 
detailed and technical structure of the statute did not support an implicit exception for equitable tolling.27  
The Court mentioned that tax law generally avoids mentioning case specific exceptions because of the 
high volume of returns the IRS must process.28  It did not specifically rule out tax provisions from 
possible equitable tolling nor did it limit the rule prohibiting equitable tolling to situations involving high 
volume IRS activities such as refunds.  In short, it left enough room for taxpayers with other tax issues to 
hold out hope that equitable tolling might apply.29 
 
                                                     
24 847 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Haw. 1993), aff’d, 70 F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995) 
25 519 U.S. 350 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. at 352. 
29 This hope currently rests with the case of Auburn Regional Medical Center v. Sibelius, 642 F.3d 1145 
(D.C. Cir. 2011), Sup. Ct. Dkt. No. 11-1231,cert. granted June 25, 2012.  The Auburn case concerns a 
very late claim by hospitals to receive Medicare reimbursement.  The late claims resulted from 
inappropriate Medicare calculations by the government and concealment of the mistake.  While taxes are 
not at issue, the D.C. Circuit referenced Brockamp in its decision.  Auburn offers the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to clarify or overturn Brockamp.  For a discussion of this case and its applicability to time 
periods established in the Internal Revenue Code, see Carlton M. Smith, Cracks Appear in the Code’s 
‘Jurisdictional’ Time Provisions, Tax Notes 511 (October 29, 2012). 
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III. Discussion of Section 6511(h) 
 
A. Legislative History of Section 6511(h) 
 
The Brockamp case revealed a harshness that often exists in the Code’s enforcement.30  Both 
Congress and the Clinton administration recognized that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Brockamp 
contrasted with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Webb and yielded inequitable results.31  The decisions led 
President Clinton to urge the Department of the Treasury to revise the law so that such decisions would 
no longer be left up to the courts.32  President Clinton “concluded that the law at times may produce harsh 
results. This is particularly so when taxpayers fail to seek a refund because of a well-documented 
disability, or similar compelling circumstance.  Accordingly, he has directed the Secretary of the Treasury 
promptly to make recommendations to him concerning whether and how the law should be changed to 
avoid such unfair results.”33 Then-Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin commented that he and Clinton 
believed that there should exist “a tax system that is responsive to the personal hardships faced by 
incapacitated taxpayers.”34 
In the House of Representatives, two Congressional members had a similar response to the 
Circuit Court opinions in the Brockamp and Webb cases.35  A bipartisan effort by Democratic 
Representative Robert T. Matsui of California and Republican Representative Jennifer B. Dunn of 
Washington sought to revise section 6511 to allow for tolling of the statute under prescribed 
circumstances.36  Representative Dunn cited to the “outrageous injustice” created by Brockamp which she 
sought to correct with a “commonsense change of law.”37  Representatives Matsui and Dunn, along with 
                                                     
30 See David G. Savage, Woman Wins Victory--but No Refund--in IRS Battle, L.A. Times (Feb. 14, 1997) 
(stating that Brockamp reveals that “strict enforcement of the rules, rather than a sense of fairness, reigns 
in the area of tax law.”). 
31 See Andrea Sharetta, Problem of Equitable Tolling in Tax Refund Claims, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
545, 588 (1996) (“Both the legislative and executive branches have recognized that a legislative fix is in 
order”).  The push to fix the problem came before the Supreme Court reached its decision but after the 
Circuit Courts had rendered their opinions.  Both cases presented extreme circumstances where the 
possibility of injustice existed. 
32 See Office of the White House Secretary, Press Release, Jan. 31, 1996; see also Tax Notes Today, 96-
3438 (Feb. 2, 1996); Sharetta, supra note 31, at 588 (“Both the legislative and executive branches have 
recognized that a legislative fix is in order”).  “Because the cases involved extremely sympathetic 
taxpayers, and the government is essentially asking the Court to disregard equity, the Clinton 
administration has publicly encouraged Treasury to work on a possible legislative fix.”  Tax Notes Today, 
96-3438 (Feb. 2, 1996). 
33 Office of the White House Secretary, Press Release, Jan. 31, 1996; see Leslie Berger, Woman's Battle 
With IRS May Reach High Court, L.A. Times (Feb. 17, 1996) 1996 WLNR 5243063 (“The seeming 
absurdity of Brockamp’s plight has drawn the attention of even President Clinton.”). 
34 Dep't of the Treas. News Release RR-955 (March 20, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT 
File, 96 TNT 57-67.  Note that Secretary Rubin’s comments are not limited to the refund context. 
35 See 142 CONG. Rec. H3411-12 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dunn). 
36 See 142 CONG. Rec. H3411-12 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dunn). 
37 See 142 CONG. Rec. H3411-12 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dunn).  Representative 
Dunn’s statement: 
I will continue to work for the inclusion of an additional provision in the final version of 
[the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2] . . . .  Specifically, the bipartisan provision, which I am 
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the House Ways and Means Committee, wished to have a provision for tolling in tax refund cases with 
the appropriate equitable circumstances added to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2.38  The proposal would 
have been as follows: 
 
(h) SUSPENSION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION ON FILING CLAIMS.-The running 
of any period of time specified in subsection (a), (b), or (c)39 shall be suspended for the 
period during which it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that (1) the 
taxpayer is incompetent (as determined by a court), (2) the taxpayer is committed to a 
mental institution or hospital, or(3) to the extent provided in regulations, the taxpayer 
suffers from any debilitating physical or mental condition which prevents the taxpayer 
from managing the taxpayer's financial affairs.40 
 
Despite their efforts, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 went into effect without such an equitable tolling 
provision.41 
In the following year the Supreme Court reached its conclusion in Brockamp, making clear that 
the injustice Congressman Dunn and Matsui tried to fix in 1996 had come to pass.  As part of the 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Congress placed in the refund statute an ability to suspend the 
statute in the event the taxpayer is experiencing "financial disability."42  Section 6511(h) provides that the 
limitations periods for filing a refund claim “shall be suspended during any period” in which the taxpayer 
is financially disabled.43  The statutory language of subsection (h) boils down to essentially three 
requirements: (1) the taxpayer must have a physical or mental impairment; (2) the impairment must be 
medically determinable; and (3) the impairment must bear a causal relationship to the taxpayer’s inability 
                                                                                                                                                                           
sponsoring along with my colleague, Mr. Matsui, would permit "equitable tolling" 
application in tax refund cases. My interest in this area was precipitated by a highly 
publicized court case in which a 93-year-old senile man, Stanley McGill, overpaid his 
taxes in 1984 . . . .   Although the agency acknowledged the mistake, it refused to return 
the money, claiming the 3-year statue [sic] of limitations on refund claims had 
expired . . . .  This is just one example of an outrageous injustice that my commonsense 
change of law is intended to end. H.R. 2337, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, will help the 
average American, who might have made an honest mistake in underestimating his taxes 
due by providing him a little more time to prove it was an honest mistake. The new 
majority in this Congress is working on commonsense ways to give taxpayers a break. 
Id. 
38 See 142 CONG. REC. H3411-12 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dunn); see also Andrea 
Sharetta, Problem of Equitable Tolling in Tax Refund Claims, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 545, 589 fn197 
(1996).  The Taxpayer Bill of Rights is legislation designed “to provide for increased taxpayer 
protections.”  Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452, available at: 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tbor2.pdf. 
39 Subsection (a) of 6511 states that a claim for refund must be filed within the later of three years from 
the time the return was filed or two years after the tax was paid. 
40 See Dunn's Equitable Tolling Amendment to Section 6511, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 6, 1997 (Doc. No. 
97-3678) 
41 See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
42 July 22, 1998, Pub.L. 105-206, Title III, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 740 
43 See I.R.C. § 6511(h). 
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to manage financial affairs.44  The statute further mandates that the taxpayer not have authorized an 
individual to act on the taxpayer’s behalf in financial matters.  Each of the listed requirements to establish 
financial disability limits the overall benefit Congress sought to confer and may create limitations greater 
than intended. 
 The scope of relief to disabled individuals provided through IRC 6511(h) narrowly limits relief to 
the refund setting.45  Moreover, the medical limitations in Section 6511(h) may too narrowly define the 
circumstances needed to establish financial disability.  The cases triggering passage of subsection (h) 
generally involved some physical or medical condition which impaired the taxpayer and prevented the 
timely filing of the refund claim: Brockamp (dementia); Scott (alcoholism); Webb (sedatives and other 
drugs administered by her “evil” doctor). Other cases seeking equitable tolling, however, raised other 
concerns: Lovett (alleged wrong advice from Veteran’s Administration); Oropallo (carbon monoxide 
poisoning ); and Vintilla (alleged disparate treatment by IRS vis a vis other similarly situated taxpayers 
and alleged misleading IRS advice).46  By linking financial disability to physical and mental impairment, 
the statute misses other circumstances that raise significant equitable issues.  Congress should give the 
IRS, and the Courts, a freer hand to determine circumstances where equity dictates broader options for 
relief.  Congress delegated such authority in the 1998 legislation by signaling to the IRS it wanted more 
                                                     
44 See Section 6511(h); see also BRUCE A. MCGOVERN, The New Provision for Tolling the Limitations 
Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform, 65 MO. 
L.REV. 797, 855 (2000). 
45 Other bases exist and should receive recognition. The case described at the beginning of this article 
represents a wrongful levy circumstance covered by IRC 6343.  The time frame for pursuing a wrongful 
levy claim is only nine months after the taking of the property.45  The same need for equitable tolling that 
exists with respect to refund claims can also exist for claims of wrongfully seized property.  In addition to 
the case described above from the Villanova Tax Clinic, at least four decided cases point to the need for 
equitable tolling of the time period for claiming wrongful levy and deserve some mention in pointing out 
the need for equitable tolling in this context.  In Volpicelli, the individual claiming the wrongful levy was 
a minor at the time the property was taken.45  His father unsuccessfully sought return of the property.  
Upon reaching the age of majority Logan Volpicelli brought his own action seeking return of the property 
several years after its taking.  Citing Brockamp and an absence of equitable language in the Internal 
Revenue Code for wrongful levy, the District Court dismissed the suit.  Other cases include Becton 
Dickenson & Co. v. Wolkenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 352 (3d Cir. 2000)(citing additional similar cases); 
Supermail Cargo Inc. v. United Sates, 68 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1995); and Capital Tracing v. United States, 
63 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1995)  The Supreme Court has commented on this short time frame: “The demand 
for greater haste when a third party contests a levy is no accident; as the Government explained in the 
hearing and before the passage of the Act, since after seizure of property for non-payment of taxes an IRS 
district director is likely to suspend further collection activities against the taxpayer, it is essential that he 
be advised promptly if he has seized property which does not belong to the taxpayer.”  E C Term of Years 
Trust v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 431-432 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
46 Additionally, Amoco Productions involved a family limited partnership, the Newton Sheep Company, 
claiming equitable tolling due to the unusual application of the windfall profits tax.  The Tenth Circuit 
details how the Newton Sheep Company was, or should have been, aware of the need to file a protective 
claim for refund.  The failure to meet the time period for filing a refund claim in this instance did not stem 
from a physical or mental impairment.  Section 6511 would not allow tolling for any taxpayer other than 
an individual because only an individual can experience physical or mental impairment.  Many of the 
cases discussed in Professor Smith’s articles, see Smith, infra note [ ], involve corporations, and one 
individual case concerns age of majority rather than physical or mental disability.  (One case in the 
Villanova clinic involved a guardian stealing from a minor ward and causing incorrect tax filings which 
the ward did not discover until reaching the age of majority.) 
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comprehensive relief for individuals seeking offers in compromise and by enacting legislation that created 
broader equitable relief for innocent spouse claimants.47  Because Section 6511(h) was also a part of the 
1998 Reform Act, it is unclear why Congress chose to define financial disability so narrowly. 
 Although the legislative history of Section 6511(h) does not specifically explain the origin of the 
“financially disabled” term, it is evident that Congress drew on statutory language from elsewhere in the 
Code.48  Section 22, which provides a credit for the elderly and permanently disabled, defines permanent 
and total disability as “any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected 
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 
[twelve] months.”49  The language definition of “disabled” in Section 22 was first used in the Social 
Security Amendments of 195650 as a threshold for receiving Social Security Disability Insurance 
benefits.51 
 
B. IRS Guidance on Section 6511(h) 
 
Section 6511(h) grants the Secretary the authority to require certain proof of the taxpayer’s 
financial disability.52  Accordingly, in April 1999, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 99-21,53 which “sets 
forth in detail the ‘form and manner’ in which proof of financial disability must be provided.”54  To 
establish a period of financial disability, the taxpayer must submit two very specific pieces of 
documentation.  First, the taxpayer must submit a physician’s written statement that sets forth:  
(a) the name and a description of the taxpayer’s physical or mental impairment; 
(b) the physician's medical opinion that the physical or mental impairment prevented the 
taxpayer from managing the taxpayer's financial affairs; 
                                                     
47 See Pub. L. 105-599, Section 3462 and Section 3462 of the Senate Amendment (legislative history of 
7122(c)(3)(A)); I.R.C. § 6015(f); Pub. L. 105-599, Section 3201; see also I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(1) Pub. L. 
No. 107-17 (enacted by Congress in 2002, giving the IRS discretion to waive the 60-day period for IRA 
rollovers).  For a more extensive discussion of Section 408, see infra notes [  ] – [  ] and accompanying 
text.  
48 See McGovern, supra note 44, at 850, n.286 (stating that “the legislative history of Section 6511(h) is 
silent as to the origin of the definition of ‘financially disabled.’”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, pt. 1, at 
68-69 (1997); S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 145 (1998); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 146-47 (1998)). 
49 See I.R.C. § 22. 
50 See Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 807, 815 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)); 
see also McGovern, supra note 44, at 850, n.289. 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 
52 See 26 U.S.C. 6511(h) 
53 See Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 CB 960, April 8, 1999 (Limitations on Credit or Refund – Suspension of 
Period While Taxpayer is Disabled).  Despite the passage of fourteen years, this guidance is in the form of 
a Revenue Procedure on which the public has not had the opportunity to comment in the manner 
contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act.  The IRS has yet to promulgate a regulation.  Its 
failure to use formal agency rulemaking arguably leaves this guidance vulnerable to attack.  One taxpayer 
has argued that Rev. Proc. 99-21 should not control the determination because of the failure of the IRS to 
use the formal rulemaking provisions.  The Eighth Circuit rejected that argument and found the procedure 
reasonable.  Abston v. Commissioner, No. 11-3689 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) 
54 Bova v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 449, 455 (Fed. Cl. 2008).  
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(c) the physician's medical opinion that the physical or mental impairment was or can be 
expected to result in death, or that it has lasted (or can be expected to last) for a 
continuous period of not less than 12 months;55 
(d) to the best of the physician's knowledge, the specific time period during which the 
taxpayer was prevented by such physical or mental impairment from managing the 
taxpayer's financial affairs; and 
(e) the following certification, signed by the physician: 
I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the above 
representations are true, correct, and complete.56 
The taxpayer also must submit a statement that no other person was authorized to act on behalf of the 
taxpayer regarding financial matters during the period of financial disability.57  Any time period during 
which an individual was authorized to act for the taxpayer in financial matters must be included when 
determining the limitations period.58 
 
C. Judicial Application of Section 6511(h)  
 
i. Judicial Refusal to Equitably Toll Section 6511 
 
Focusing on refund claims brought under Section 6511, the lower courts have adhered to Brockamp 
in holding that the limitations period generally cannot be equitably tolled.  In implementing Section 
6511(h)’s financial disability provision, the IRS has imposed a number of requirements on taxpayers who 
are seeking to establish such disability.  When circumstances fall clearly outside the scope of Section 
6511(h) or when taxpayers fail to properly substantiate their disability, courts have refused to apply 
equitable tolling to refund claims. 
The First Circuit has strictly applied Brockamp to what is commonly referred to as Section 6511’s 
“look back” provision.59  In addition to limiting the time within which a taxpayer may file a claim for 
refund, Section 6511 also places limits on the amount of refunds available to taxpayers.  Pursuant to 
Section 6511(b)(2)(A), a taxpayer is entitled to a refund equal to the amount of the tax paid within the 
three years immediately preceding the refund claim, plus the period of any extension of time for filing the 
return.  In Dickow v. United States,60 the court rejected a taxpayer’s argument that he was entitled to 
equitable tolling under this subsection for a refund claim relating to a portion of an estimated estate tax 
payment made several years prior.61  Quoting Brockamp, the First Circuit reiterated that “[c]ourts cannot 
                                                     
55 This twelve-month period tracks the requirement in Section 22 but places a limitation not found in 
Section 6511(h) on taxpayers seeking this relief.  No one has challenged this time limitation yet. 
56 See Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 CB 960, April 8, 1999.  The meaning of “physician” is set forth in the 
Social Security Act § 1861(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r). 
57 See Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 CB 960, April 8, 1999 
58 See SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶11.05. Rules Applicable to Claims for Credit or 
Refund. 
59 See Dickow v. United States, 654 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2011). 
60 654 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2011) 
61 Under Section 6075(a), federal tax returns for estates are due nine months after the death of the 
deceased.  In this case, estate taxes were due on October 15, 2003.  Dickow, as executor of the estate, 
filed an application for a time extension, including with the mailing an estimated payment for the estate 
taxes.  The IRS received the application on October 14, 2003, and the filing deadline was extended until 
April 15, 2004. See Treas. Reg. 20.6081-1(b).  On March 23, 2004, Dickow submitted a second request 
for a time extension, which the IRS did not approve.  Dickow finally filed the estate tax return on 
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toll, for nonstatutory equitable reasons, the statutory time (and related amount) limitations for filing tax 
refund claims set forth in section 6511.”62 
The Northern District of Mississippi similarly held that Section 6511’s statute of limitations cannot be 
equitably tolled.  The taxpayer in Davis v. United States63 argued that he was entitled to equitable tolling 
of the limitations period because the time limitation for filing a refund claim seeking return of his estate 
tax payment allegedly expired before “the refund claim and its value came into existence.”64  Specifically, 
the taxpayer paid estate taxes on a parcel of property believed to be held by the decedent in fee simple, 
but was later determined to be only a vested remainder.  Davis’ refund claim, filed after resolution of the 
issue by the Mississippi Court of Appeals, was denied by the IRS as untimely.  Davis asserted that 
taxpayers need to have “sufficient legal and factual grounds to file a claim for refund and that . . . [the 
estate] lacked sufficient grounds to file a claim prior to the statutory deadline.”65  The district court, 
although sympathetic to the taxpayer’s situation, concluded that “the law directs a finding inconsistent 
with the [c]ourt’s sympathies” and disallowed the claim.66  
In regards to the tolling provision, Section 6511(h) requires that no individual be authorized to act on 
the taxpayer’s behalf.67  In Plati v. United States,68 the Court of Federal Claims held that because the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
September 30, 2004, seeking a refund of the estimated payment previously submitted, and the IRS 
refunded the requested amount.  On September 10, 2007, Dickow filed an amended return seeking an 
additional refund, which the IRS denied as untimely.  Dickow’s equitable estoppel argument alleged that 
the IRS misrepresented to him that his second request for a time extension had been granted. 
62 See Dickow, 654 F.3d at 151-52 (quoting United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 348). 
63 2011 WL 6294467 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011) 
64 Davis v. United States, 2011 WL 6294467 *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011).             
65 See id.  On February 3, 2003, Davis filed a federal income tax return on behalf of the estate at issue, 
reporting a liability of nearly $500,000.  The estate included a parcel of property believed to be possessed 
in fee simple by the decedent.  On April 17, 2003, Davis paid the IRS approximately $400,000, 
representing estate taxes, interest, and penalties.  Several months later, a chancery court in Mississippi 
determined that the decedent had held only a vested remainder in the property as opposed to a fee simple 
interest.  The ruling was upheld by the Mississippi Court of Appeals, and the Mississippi Supreme Court 
denied certiorari on March 2, 2006.  Davis then filed an administrative claim with the IRS on November 4, 
2008, seeking a refund of overpaid federal estate taxes.  The IRS denied the refund claim as untimely, 
asserting that the claim was not filed within three years of the filing of the return or two years of payment. 
66 See Davis, 2011 WL 6294467  at *1. These two cases, Dickow and Davis, suggest that Section 6511 
may not adequately accommodate the complexities and uncertainty inherent in estate administration, 
specifically estimated estate tax payments.  In a recent case similar to Davis, where a taxpayer filed a 
refund suit after litigation of an underlying issue, the Court of Federal Claims declined to toll Section 
6511’s statute of limitations.  See Haas v. United States, __ Fed. Cl. __, 2012 WL 4320652 (2012).  In 
Haas, the taxpayer, a seventy-five-year-old veteran, sought a ruling from the Department of Veterans 
Affairs in 2001 that his medical conditions were a result of his service in Vietnam.  Eight years and a 
number of appeals later, the taxpayer ultimately was granted service connection for his disability.  
Because compensation for disabilities related to service in the armed forces is not considered taxable 
income under Section 104(a)(4), the taxpayer filed amended income tax returns in 2010 for the years 
2001-2009.  The IRS granted refunds for 2007 through 2009, but denied the refund claims for 2001-2006 
as untimely.  The taxpayer filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that due to the delay in the 
decision on his claim for veterans benefits, he was unable to file amended tax returns before 2010.  The 
court held that the statute of limitations could not be equitably tolled and that the refund claims for tax 
years 2001-2004 were therefore untimely. 
67 See I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B). 
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taxpayer had authorized an individual to act on her behalf regarding financial matters during the time 
period at issue, she was not financially disabled for purposes of Section 6511.  The court firmly applied 
the statutory language, stating that the relevant inquiry is into whether an individual is authorized to act 
on the taxpayer’s behalf, “not whether the authorized person actually took such action.”69  Therefore, 
although the taxpayer had insisted on managing her own finances, the fact that she had designated her son 
to manage her financial matters foreclosed her from bringing a refund claim.70  While Mrs. Plati’s 
continued involvement in her financial affairs made it difficult or practically impossible for her son to 
manage her financial affairs, the decision tracks the language of the statute. 
The decisions regarding 6511(h) almost uniformly hold for the IRS.  The effect of the statute in 
causing the IRS to concede the application of tolling remains unknown since these types of decisions do 
not become public.  Section 6511(h) does not appear to have opened floodgates of cases with financial 
disability.  It provides a narrow exception to one circumstance where a time frame can bar recovery. 
 
ii. Judicial Treatment of Revenue Procedure 99-21 
 
Rev. Proc. 99-21’s requirements have led courts to reach various conclusions when faced with 
“technically deficient” documentation of medically determinable illnesses.71  Taxpayers who submit only 
medical records to prove financial disability and fail to submit an accompanying physician’s statement 
generally have been denied the benefit of Section 6511(h)’s tolling provision.72  Most courts have also 
strictly adhered to the specific requirements for physician statements set forth in Rev. Proc. 99-21. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
68 99 Fed.Cl. 634 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 19, 2011) 
69 See Plati v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. 634, 641 (Aug. 19, 2011) (citing Bova v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 
449, 458 n. 12 (2008)).  The taxpayer at issue, Ms. Plati, had designated her son as her attorney-in-fact 
with the authority to manage her financial affairs.  However, Ms. Plati “insist[ed] on keeping control” and 
“did not let [him] have control or authority to act for her.”  See id. at 640. 
70 See Plati, 99 Fed.Cl. at 641 (“The plaintiff does not dispute that Mr. Plati  was indeed authorized to act 
for his mother, Ms. Plati, in her financial matters.  Whether Mr. Plati had difficulty in doing so does not 
change the application of the plain language of the statute.”). 
71 See Abston v. Commissioner, 109 AFTR 2d 2012-508, (E.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 2011)(Granting summary 
judgment for the Government stating Abston “had not proferred the necessary evidence to permit 
consideration of whether the limitations period was suspended.”  She chose not to submit a physician’s 
statement probably knowing she could not obtain one that would met the requirements of the Revenue 
Procedure.), aff’d, No. 11-3689 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2012)(Abston did not come to the Court with clean 
hands.  She waited to file her refund claim in order to avoid its almost certain offset to pay her 
outstanding student loans.); see also  Bowman v. IRS, 2010 WL 2991712 at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) 
(holding that technically deficient physician's statement can be cured by supplemental physician 
statements to comply with Revenue Procedure 99-21); Walter v. United States, 2009 WL 5062391 at *10 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2009) (same) with Estate of Rubinstein v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 640, 652 (Fed. Cl. 
2011) (holding that “[s]trict compliance with [Revenue Procedure 99-21] is necessary.”); Ibeagwa v. 
United States, 2009 WL 3172165 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2009) (same); Nunn v. United States, 2009 
WL 260803 at *4 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 4, 2009) (same)). 
72 See, e.g., Abston v. Commissioner, 109 AFTR 2d 2012-508 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 2011), aff’d, No. 11-
3689 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (holding taxpayer ineligible for equitable tolling for failure to submit 
physician statement); Henry v. United States, 2006 WL 3780878 at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2006) 
(dismissing taxpayer's claim because she failed to submit physician's statement, stating that physician's 
written statement “is necessary to claim financial disability”). 
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In Bowman v. IRS,73 for example, the Eastern District of California declined to toll the statute of 
limitations for a taxpayer who had submitted a fairly comprehensive physician statement. 74  The court 
deemed the statement technically deficient because it failed to set forth the dates of treatment or include a 
basis for the physician’s knowledge of the taxpayer’s illness.75  After stating that Section 6511(b) bars a 
refund claim unless a taxpayer can show he was financially disabled under Section 6511(h), the court 
detailed the requirements for proving financial disability under Rev. Proc. 99-21.76  The court noted that 
“[w]here a physician substantially complies with Revenue Procedure 99-21, technical deficiencies may be 
cured by a supplemental statement.”77  The court then directed the taxpayer to include a statement by the 
physician setting forth the treatment dates and including a basis for his knowledge of the illness during 
the years at issue.78  However, due to the failure of the taxpayer to submit the additional information, the 
district court ultimately granted the government’s motion to dismiss.79   
The District of New Jersey also refused to find that a taxpayer was financially disabled after rigid 
application of Rev. Proc. 99-21’s requirements.  The taxpayer in Pleconis v. IRS80 sought to toll the 
statute of limitations under Section 6511(h) for the period of time during which he had undergone five 
back surgeries, in addition to two heart surgeries.81  The taxpayer thus submitted a physician statement 
                                                     
73 2010 WL 2991712 (E.D.Cal. July 29, 2010) 
74 See Bowman v. I.R.S., 2010 WL 1780194 (E.D.Cal. April 30, 2010).  To provide some factual 
background, the taxpayer had filed a 2001 tax return on September 24, 2006 with a letter stating that he 
was submitting a refund claim because he had been incarcerated since November of 2001.  See id.  An 
IRS Appeals Officer responded on January 7, 2008, describing to the taxpayer the requirements of 
Revenue Procedure 99-21.  The taxpayer responded with a letter, dated January 16, 2008, and included 
medical records.  He did not, however, include a written statement from a physician addressing the 
requirements of Revenue Procedure 99-21.  See id. 
75 Bowman v. IRS, 2010 WL 2991712 (E.D.Cal. July 29, 2010).  The physician statement stated, in part: 
“I hereby certify that Mr. Bowman, who is 48, has been suffering from years of chronic daily headaches 
with clear migraine characteristics. They have been intense and daily for over six years with the last two 
years being more intense even . . . . In these conditions it is understandable that his concentration and 
productivity is greatly affected and therefore feasible that for medical reasons he has at times in the last 
years been unable to fulfil[l] his duties of doing the tax return in a timely fashion . . . . This statement is 
signed by Marc Lenaerts M.D., and dated October 28, 2009.” 
76 Bowman v. IRS, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5611 (July 29, 2010).  The district court’s opinion went through 
a discussion of Brockamp, stating that 6511(h) was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brockamp for circumstances in which taxpayers are facing financial disability.  See id. 
77 Bowman v. IRS, 2010 WL 2991712 (E.D.Cal. July 29, 2010) (citing Walter v. United States, 2010 WL 
724445, *4 (W.D.Pa. 2010). 
78 Bowman v. IRS, 2010 WL 2991712 (E.D.Cal. July 29, 2010).   
79 See Bowman v. I.R.S., 2010 WL 3516685 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) 
80 2011 WL 3502057 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2011) 
81 See Pleconis at *2.  Mr. Pleconis and his wife had failed to file joint returns for the tax years 1999 
through 2003 until late in 2007.  See id. at *1.  To satisfy interest and penalties that had accrued, the IRS 
levied the taxpayer’s bank account.  The IRS also denied the taxpayer’s refund claims for several of the 
tax years.  See id.  Pleconis also suffered from sleep apnea, obstructive sleep, and restless leg syndrome.  
See id.  The court, however, noted that Placonis was able to play an active role as the owner of his own 
company, a gas detection device servicer.  The court suggested that his participation in the company 
undercut the extent and nature of his alleged injuries.  See id. 
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which specifically stated that “[t]he surgeries, rehabilitation and pain medication could be expected to 
have an adverse effect on the patient’s ability to carry about business and personal activities.”82  The 
taxpayer’s cardiologist also opined that, because of his medical condition, “there may be adverse effects 
on the patient’s ability to carry out business and personal activities correctly.”83  The district court held 
that these statements, however, did not sufficiently comply with the Revenue Procedure, which requires 
that a physician opine that the injury actually prevented the taxpayer from managing his financial 
affairs.84 
One trial court has held that substantial compliance is sufficient to establish financial disability.  In 
Walter v. United States,85 did not require strict adherence to Rev. Proc. 99-21’s requirements.  The 
taxpayer at issue submitted a physician’s statement, which stated that the taxpayer’s failure to file his tax 
return “was a result of his clinical depression” in attempt to prove financial disability .86  Later, when the 
case moved to the litigation phase, the physician wrote a more thorough supplemental statement, which 
the taxpayers submitted to the court.  The IRS argued that the taxpayer could not submit a supplemental 
statement, and that the initial documentation was insufficient because it did not specifically assert that the 
taxpayer’s clinical depression “prevented him from managing his financial affairs.”87  The court, however, 
held that the taxpayer substantially complied with Rev. Proc. 99-21 by submitting a physician’s statement 
and providing the supplemental letter.  The taxpayer received the benefit of the tolling of Section 6511’s 
time limitations.88 
 
IV. Continuing Effort to Expand Relief for Missed Time Frames 
 
A. Legislative Responses in the Internal Revenue Code 
 
Including Section 6511(h), the Code contains a total of four statutory provisions that allow 
taxpayers the benefit of tolling limitations periods.  The three additional statutes, discussed below, each 
present an example of when and how the IRS may determine that a taxpayer is entitled to tolling.  This 
Article will draw on some positive aspect of each statutory provision to create an adequate financial 
disability statute. 
 
                                                     
82 See id. at [ ]. 
83 See id. at [ ]. 
84 See Pleconis at *2 (“Neither of Plaintiff’s physicians opined that his various impairments actually 
prevented him from managing his affairs.”).  Additionally, the district court examined the extent of 
Pleconis’s injuries.  The court noted that he was “able to talk on the phone, watch television, surf the 
internet, drive to the pharmacy for his prescriptions, and do ‘light grocery shopping.’”  See id.  These 
abilities undercut Pleconis’s argument that he was unable to file his tax returns in those years, and the 
court concluded that he was able to manage his finances.  See id. 
85  2009 WL 5062391 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
86 Walter, 2009 WL 5062391, at *9. 
87 See id. at *10. 
88 See id. at *11. 
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i. Section 7508 
 
Section 7508 continues a line of special provisions for members of the armed services that trace 
their history back to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.89  The changes to the special 
provisions for members of the armed services generally run parallel to the United States’ involvement in 
foreign conflicts.90  In the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress enacted the first general waiver provision for 
limitations periods in the Code.91  This waiver was not specific to individuals serving in combat zones, 
but recognized the necessity for the extension of statutory limitations periods under certain defined 
circumstances.92 
World War II brought about the first extension of limitations periods for certain individuals 
affected by war conditions.93  The Revenue Act of 1942 added to the Code Section 3804, Section 7508’s 
predecessor provision, which was “designed to expand, in situations described, the time specified for the 
performance of certain acts where the ability to do or perform those acts would or might be affected by 
the war.”94  This wartime provision allowed an extension for the period during which any individual was 
outside of the western hemisphere for more than ninety days and the following ninety days thereafter.95  
The time extension therefore applied to any individual caught outside of the country during the war, not 
                                                     
89 See Rousseau, supra note [  ] (“Since the inception of the first modern income taxation in the United 
States in 1913, special federal income tax benefits have been granted for service members.”). 
90 See Edward A. Beck, III, The Taxation of Members of the Armed Services: Legislative and 
Administrative Changes Arising from the Persian Gulf Conflict, 38 Fed. B. News & J. 350, 350 (Aug. 
1991).  Before Congress allowed for the suspension of certain limitations provisions for individuals 
serving in such conflict, it provided benefits to such individuals through exclusions from federal income 
tax.  See id.  In addition to the time limit extensions granted to active service members discussed in this 
article, the Code also provides for pay to active service members to be excluded from taxation.  The 
Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 allowed for an exclusion from federal income taxation of up to $1500 
for commissioned officers.  See Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 68, Section 7,57 Stat. 126 
(1943).  Subsequently the Revenue Act of 1945 allowed for all pay for active service members to be 
excluded from federal income taxation.  See Revenue Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 214, Section 3808, 59 Stat. 
556 (1945).  Congress initially gave special treatment to members of the Armed Forces during World War 
I by enacting a provision which excluded up to $3,500 from taxable income of salaries received by 
individuals engaged in active service, either abroad or at sea.  See Kusiak, CDR, JAGC, USN, Income 
Tax Exclusion for Military Personnel During War; Examining the Historical Development, Discerning 
Underlying Principles, and Identifying Areas for Change., 39 Fed. B. News & J. 146 (1992) (citing 
H.R.REP. NO. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 1, 48 (1919)).  This specific provision remained in effect until 
1921.  See id. 
91 See 15 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n § 57:2 (citing Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 
Stat. 227, 265-266). 
92 See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 265-266.  This Section 250(d) provided that 
the statute of limitations would apply “unless both the Commissioner and the taxpayer consent in writing 
to a later determination, assessment, and collection of the tax.”  See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 
250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 265-266.  Currently, this provision is present as I.R.C. Section 6501(c)(4). 
93 Members of the Armed Forces serving during World War II “were beneficiaries of a host of tax 
exemptions and exclusions enacted during World War II.”  See Kusiak, supra note 90 (noting that these 
benefits included an extension of the time period to file tax returns and to pay taxes). 
94 Hamilton v. C.I.R., 13 T.C. 747, 750 (Nov. 14, 1949). 
95 See Section 507 of the Revenue Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 798, 961 (1942)). 
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just service members.96  The committee reports that discussed the addition of Section 3804 to the Code 
noted that the allowance for the extension of the listed limitations periods was due to the fact that such 
acts were “impracticable or impossible on account of war conditions.”97 
As the United States has continued to involve itself in foreign conflicts, Congress has repeatedly 
allowed for the extension of certain limitations periods, but generally only for those individuals who are 
serving in the Armed Forces.98  The time limit extensions were revised to accommodate individuals either 
serving directly or serving in support of the Armed Forces, in areas designated as combat zones by the 
President through an Executive Order.99  Such benefits also extended to such individuals who were 
hospitalized abroad for injuries that occurred during service in a combat zone.100  The extension amounted 
to the length of time of service in a combat zone, in addition to the length of time of hospitalization 
abroad, and an additional 180 days.101  In 1954, the Revenue Act recodified Section 3804 into the current 
Section 7508, making no material change to the provision.102  Section 7508 has since been revised to 
include those individuals serving in the foreign conflicts in which the United States has become 
involved.103  Regarding the Kosovo conflict, President Clinton stated: “With our citizens working so hard 
to protect the people of Kosovo, they shouldn't have to worry about their taxes.”104 
                                                     
96 In addition to being broader in the scope of who was covered 3804 also seems broader than 7508 in 
terms of “where” is covered, because it appears to cover individuals outside the western hemisphere no 
matter where they were outside that zone. 
97 Hamilton v. C.I.R., 13 T.C. 747, 750 (Nov. 14, 1949) (noting that the committee reports relating to 
Section 3804 were limited to this brief discussion).  Modes of communication were much different then, 
which may account for the broad geographical grant of relief compared to the more geographically 
limited grant under 7508 now that computers and phones allow relatively easy access across the globe.  
Soon after the end of World War II, Congress amended Section 3804 to discontinue the extension of the 
limitations period after December 31, 1947.  See 15 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n § 57:2 (citing Pub. 
L. No. 384, Sec. 13, amending I.R.C. (1939) Section 3804(c)). 
98 See 15 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n § 57:2.  In the past few decades, Section 7508 has been 
amended to address foreign conflicts in which the United States has been engaged.  In the early 1990’s, 
President Bush by Executive Order designated the portions of the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding 
waters as a “combat zone” for purposes of Section 112.  See Kusiak, supra note 90.  Section 112 was 
enacted to provide that “gross income does not include compensation received for active service . . .”  
I.R.C. § 112.  
99 See 15 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n § 57:2. 
100 See 15 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n § 57:2. 
101 See15 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n § 57:2 
102 See H.R. 8300, 2d Session (“Section 7508. Time for performing certain acts postponed by reason of 
war.  This section, which is identical with that of the House bill, contains no material change in existing 
law. It continues in the law those provisions of section 3804 of the 1939 Code which are made necessary 
by reason of the continued application of subsection (f) of that section.”). 
103 Section 7508 was revised to accommodate those serving in the Armed Forces in Vietnam.  See Senate 
Report No. 94-1319 (stating that individuals serving in Vietnam who were missing in action or 
hospitalized receive certain tax benefits that expired after January 2, 1977).  In 1976, Congress also 
revised the language of Section 7508 which had previously extended its benefits to those individuals 
affected “by reason of war” to those affected “by reason of service in combat zone.”  See Pub.L. 94-455, 
§ 1906(a) (51) (A).  Section 7508 was subsequently amended in 1991 to include those in 1991 for those 
serving in the Gulf War and the Desert Shield Operation, in 1996 to accommodate those that served in 
Bosnia and Herzogovina, and several years later for the Armed Forces in Kosovo.  1 Casey Fed. Tax Prac. 
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ii. Section 7508A 
 
Congress enacted section 7508A in 1997, drawing on the provisions of section 7508 in its 
design.105  Whereas section 7508 suspends time limitations within the Code for combatants, the newer 
provision seeks to assist taxpayers impacted by disaster.  Similarly to section 7508, section 7508A has 
followed a number of pieces of legislation designed to assist taxpayers affected by specific disasters.106  
Congress also created a broad catch-all provision in section 7508A, which grants the Treasury with the 
authority to prescribe regulations allowing taxpayers (and the IRS) to postpone various acts required by 
the Code for up to ninety days.107  The list of acts covered follows the list in section 7508, allowing 
suspension of “[a]ny other act required or permitted under the internal revenue laws specified in 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.”108  The trigger mechanism for the IRS to use its 
authority to postpone certain actions stems from presidentially declared disasters – at least with respect to 
the natural disaster portion of the statute.109  The ninety-day period grew to 120 days in 2001.110 
While the scope of the two sections, from the perspective of what provisions the IRS may 
suspend, appears identical, section 7508A gives much more discretion to the IRS to decide when to 
suspend and for how long.  Each of the two statutes creates a zone, and when compared, the zones aid in 
illustrating the amount of IRS authority.  Where Congress creates a combat zone, any qualified taxpayer 
entering that zone has the specified tax provisions suspended for the period of time they spend in the 
combat zone plus 180 days.111  When the President declares a disaster, the IRS must analyze the nature 
and scope of the disaster to create a response tailored to that disaster.112 
                                                                                                                                                                           
§ 5:45 (citing I.R.C. 7508(f), added by Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, 102d Cong, 1st 
Sess, approved Dec. 11, 1991); P.L. 104-117: Tax Benefits for Servicemen in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(March 20, 1996) (“members of the Armed Forces performing services for the peacekeeping efforts in 
Bosnia and Herzogovina, Croatia, and Macedonia shall be entitled to tax benefits in the same manner as if 
such services were performed in a combat zone, and for other purposes”).  In 2003, Congress revised 
Section 7508 to include “contingency operations” in addition to combat zones.  Although unclear from 
legislative history, this amendment was most likely designed to accommodate for the changing nature of 
international conflicts, especially given the United States’ recent involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
See Pub. L. 108-121, § 104(b)(2). 
104 70 Daily Tax Rept. G-1 (BNA) (Apr. 13, 1999). 
105 See Pub. L. No. 105-34 
106 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 101-604 (providing limited tax benefits to victims of the terrorist attack on Pam 
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988); H.R. 4440 (2005) (“provides tax 
benefits for the Gulf Opportunity Zone and certain areas affect by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma”); Pub.L. 
109-73, H.R. 3768 (“provide[s] emergency tax relief for persons affected by Hurricane Katrina”). 
107 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7501A-1(c)(1)(vii) provides that this catch-all clause encompasses “any other 
act specified in a revenue ruling, revenue procedure, notice, announcement, news release, or other 
guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.”.  
108 See IRC § 7508A( ). 
109 See IRC § 7508A( ). 
110 See Pub. L. 107–16, §§ 802(a), 901. 
111 See Internal Revenue Service, Combat Zones, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Combat-Zones (providing 
detailed list of areas designated as combat zones).  Combat zones are designated by an Executive Order 
from the President as areas in which the Armed Forces are engaging or have engaged in combat.  There 
are currently three combat zones (including airspace above each): Arabian Peninsula Areas (beginning 
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Congress’ willingness to give to the IRS the authority to make decisions on whether and how 
much relief to grant within the parameters set by Congress shows again that Congress wants to get out of 
the business of passing legislation with minute details of the nature and scope of relief, similar to a private 
bill.  Instead, it adopts a model, as it did in section 6511(h) and in section 408(d)(3)(I), discussed below, 
to pass this authority to the agency. 
 
iii. Section 408(d) 
 
In 2001 Congress added section 408(d)(3)(I) creating the fourth statutory provision to allow 
suspension of a time period under the Code.113  This new provision permits Treasury to waive the sixty-
day rollover requirement for individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”), “where the failure to waive such 
requirement would be against equity or good conscience, including casualty, disaster, or other events 
beyond the reasonable control of the individual subject to such requirement.”114  The conference report 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Jan. 17, 1991); Kosovo area (beginning Mar. 24, 1999); Afghanistan (beginning Sept. 19, 2001).  
Additionally, the Department of Defense has certified a number of locations for combat zone tax benefits 
due to their direct support of military operations.  See id.  For a discussion of qualified service in a 
combat zone and the benefits of such service, see http://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/special-
pay/combat-zone-tax-exclusions.html.  This site also provides the specific Executive Orders that have 
created the currently qualifying combat zones as well as the Defense Department designation expanding 
that coverage.  See also T. KEITH FOGG, EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS Ch. 
23 “Assisting Military Clients” (5th Ed. 2011). 
112 The process of declaring a disaster begins with the governor of a state impacted by catastrophic event.  
See Federal Emergency Management Agency, The Declaration Process, 
http://www.fema.gov/declaration-process.  See generally Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (amending the Disaster Relief 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-288).  The President receives the request from a governor and makes a decision 
whether and where to declare a disaster working in consultation with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and the Governor’s office.  The President also decides whether the scope of relief will 
include individuals or public assistance.  See The Declaration Process.  FEMA maintains a list of areas 
that the President declares as disaster areas.  See Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster 
Declarations, http://www.fema.gov/disasters.  Once the declaration of disaster occurs, then the IRS makes 
a determination of the impact of the disaster for tax purposes and issues a notice setting out the tax 
consequences.  See, e.g., Notice 2001-61; Notice 2001-63 (issued by the IRS in response to the 9-11 
terrorist attacks).  The President declared certain areas disaster areas.  On September 13, 2001, the IRS 
issued Notice 2001-61 providing some relief.  Then on September 14, 2001, the IRS issued Notice 2001-
63 providing additional relief as more information became available.  The 9-11 terrorist attacks impacted 
three areas of the United States: New York City, Western Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon in Northern 
Virginia.  The impact on each area differed as did the President’s response in his declaration of disaster 
and the IRS’ subsequent response.  With disasters, one size does not fit all.  Congress decided to leave to 
the IRS the decision of whether to provide relief and how much relief to provide.  The IRS does not make 
this decision in a vacuum as the impacted areas have representatives in Congress who will make their 
views known if the response of the IRS does not seem appropriate.   
113 Pub. L. No. 107-17 
114 See I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(I).  After a taxpayer receives funds from an IRA, there is a sixty-day time 
limitation to complete the rollover to another IRA.  See I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(A).  If the rollover is not 
completed within sixty days, the amount received will be treated as ordinary income.  In deciding whether 
to grant a waiver of the sixty-day period, the IRS “will consider all relevant facts and circumstances, 
including: whether errors were made by the financial institution (in addition to those described under 
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describes examples of situations justifying waiver of the sixty-day period and include some reasons 
unique to this type of transaction, including failure to cash the check, errors committed by the financial 
institution, restrictions imposed by a foreign country, and postal error.115  Other examples more closely 
match, yet expand upon, the bases listed in section 6511(h) for allowing for suspending the time period: 
death, disability, hospitalization, or incarceration.116  Perhaps because the sixty-day time period is short 
and during such a short time period death, hospitalization, or incarceration could have an impact on 
failing to act within the statutory time frame, Congress did not believe a longer period such as the two or 
three year period of 6511(h) would merit.  Still, this opens possibilities for additional bases for suspension 
not considered when Congress passed 6511(h).117 
In addition to providing new bases for relief of a time period, section 408(d)(3)(A)(i) also 
provides a different procedure.  Rev. Proc. 2003-7 establishes a requirement that taxpayers must apply to 
the Service using the private letter ruling process in order to obtain relief under this provision.118   If the 
transaction meets certain safe-harbor provisions, approval through the private letter ruling process is not 
required.119  The provision of the Revenue Procedure discussing the “Requirements for a favorable 
ruling” upon application to the Service contains additional bases for granting a favorable ruling – 
“casualty, disaster or other events beyond the reasonable control of the taxpayer.”120  These additional 
bases mentioned in the Revenue Procedure also offer possibilities not considered in 6511(h). 
 
B. Legislative Responses in Other Titles 
 
Just as Congress sought to expand financial disability by enacting of Section 6511(h), the 
legislature has revised similarly inequitable statutes of limitations.   Lilly Ledbetter, a supervisor at a 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company plant, discovered that she was earning significantly less than three 
males in her same position after nineteen years of employment.  In 1998, she brought suit against 
Goodyear, asserting a Title VII equal pay claim and a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963.  In 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,121 the Supreme Court held that Ledbetter’s suit was untimely 
even though she was unaware of the discrimination during the prescribed time frame and did not learn of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
automatic waiver, above); whether you were unable to complete the rollover due to death, disability, 
hospitalization, incarceration, restrictions imposed by a foreign country or postal error; whether you used 
the amount distributed (for example, in the case of payment by check, whether you cashed the check); and 
how much time has passed since the date of distribution.”  See Retirement Plans FAQs relating to 
Waivers of the 60-Day Rollover Requirement, available at: http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-
Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-relating-to-Waivers-of-the-60-Day-Rollover-Requirement. 
115 H.R. Rep No. 84, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (2001). 
116 Id. 
117 Sections 7508 and 7508A have their own ties to 408(d)(3)(I) which permit postponement of this sixty-
day period if the taxpayer serves in a combat zone or resides in a Presidentially declared disaster area.  
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7508-1 and Rev. Proc. 2002-71. 
118 Since the beginning of the process of requesting revenue rulings set out in Rev. Proc. 2003-7, the 
Service has issued approximately 800 private letter rulings on the issue of the appropriateness of giving 
the taxpayer additional time to make a qualifying rollover of funds in an IRA. 
119 See Rev. Proc. 2003-7, Sec. 3.03 for details on automatic approval.  Such approval occurs where the 
financial institution actually received the rollover funds within sixty days together with appropriate 
instructions and the failure to complete the rollover resulted solely from the institution’s error.  
120 Rev. Proc. 2003-7, Sec. 3.02. 
121 550 U.S. 618 (2007) 
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the discrimination until years later.  The Court concluded that under the applicable 180-day limitations 
period, Ledbetter should have filed suit within six months of receiving her first discriminatory 
paycheck.122 
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling, democrats in the House of Representatives sought to 
amend the statute so that the 180-day time limit for filing suit would restart with each discriminatory 
paycheck received by the employee.123  George Miller, House Education and Labor Chairman, stated 
that the legislation “will make it clear that discrimination occurs not just when the decision to 
discriminate is made, but also when someone becomes subject to that discriminatory decision, and when 
they are affected by that discriminatory decision.”124  After the bill was struck down by the Senate, it 
was reintroduced and ultimately passed in early 2009.  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was the first 
piece of legislation signed into law by President Obama.125  Under the amended law, the occurrence of 
employment discrimination was expanded to include when an individual becomes subject to an unfair 
pay decision or when an individual is affected by such unfair compensation decision.126 
 
C. Judicial Responses 
 
While time limitations in the Internal Revenue Code may not be subject to equitable tolling due to 
their “unusually emphatic” and “technical” language, courts have relied on Irwin to allow for equitable 
tolling in other areas of law that do.  As detailed above, the Supreme Court in Irwin, in the context of 
employment discrimination, held that the “rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits 
against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.”127  Since that decision, 
equitable tolling principles have been applied to several other statutory contexts.128 
In 2010, the Supreme Court resolved an issue among the appellate courts by allowing equitable 
tolling for the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA).  Under the AEDPA, an individual in custody must file a request for habeas corpus relief 
                                                     
122 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (stating that “Ledbetter should have 
filed an EEOC charge after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to 
her.”).  Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), an individual has 180 days within which to file suit.  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]his sort deadline reflects Congress’ strong preference for the prompt 
resolution of employment discrimination allegations through voluntary conciliation and cooperation.”  
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at [ ]. 
123 See Jesse J. Holland, “House Dems Target Court’s Pay Ruling,” USA Today (June 12, 2007), 
available at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-12-2953732132_x.htm.   
124 See id. 
125 Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); see Associated Press, “Obama Touts Equal-Pay bill at Signing 
Ceremony,” NBCNews.com, available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28910789/#.UJahVcU1-sY 
(noting that President Obama chose this Act as the first piece of legislation to sign). 
126 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3). 
127 Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96. 
128 See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 420-23 (2004) (allowing untimely amendment of fee 
application under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2549 (2010) (allowing equitable tolling in habeas corpus petition).  These principles are discussed in 
Justice Stevens’ and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 
130 (2008), which disallowed equitable tolling of the six-year time limitation to file a suit against the 
United States in the Court of Federal Claims. 
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within one year in most cases from the date that the conviction becomes final.129  This one-year time 
limitation is statutorily tolled for the period in which any properly filed post-conviction relief is pending 
in state court.130  In addition to the tolling of the limitations period that is available within the statute, the 
one-year period is also subject to equitable tolling.131  In Holland v. Florida,132 the Supreme Court held 
that because the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, it is subject to a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of equitable tolling.133  The Court specifically concluded that because habeas relief 
is based in equity, and the statute “differs significantly” from the tax provision with which Brockamp was 
concerned, the equitable tolling presumption should apply.134 
Courts therefore have the discretion to award habeas relief to petitioners who otherwise would be 
denied relief under the statute of limitations.  To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner must 
establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”135  Such extraordinary circumstances have been defined as 
those in which “it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period . . . and gross injustice would 
result.”136  For example, “sufficiently egregious misconduct” by a petitioner’s counsel may be sufficient 
to toll the limitations period.137  Although circumstances in which a habeas petitioner is entitled to 
                                                     
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006).  The statute provides that a petitioner must file a habeas petition 
from the latest of: (1) the date judgment becomes final; (2) the date an impediment to filing is removed; 
(3) the date the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right; or (4) the date the factual predicate of the 
claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.  See id.  Prior to the enactment of 
the AEDPA, there was no statute of limitations governing federal habeas filings.  See Day v. McDonough, 
548 U.S. 198, 214 (2006) (stating that “[h]istorically, there [wa]s no statute of limitations governing 
federal habeas.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).  Because of the complexities involved in calculating the one-year statute 
of limitations, the Supreme Court has heard AEDPA limitations period cases twelve times since its 
enactment.  See Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 553 (2009). 
131 This statute does not, however, contain any language itself setting out circumstances under which it 
could be tolled in the same manner as I.R.C. 6511(h) or I.R.C. 408). 
132 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010) 
133 In Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, the Supreme Court laid out a test to determine whether a 
limitations period is “jurisdictional.”  To resolve whether the limitations period in the context of an appeal 
of a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision could be equitably tolled, and accordingly, whether such time 
limitation should be categorized as jurisdictional, the Supreme Court pointed to several factors to 
eventually conclude that the limitations period at issue was not jurisdictional. First, the Court looked to 
the fact that the statute did not indicate that the time limitation “was meant to carry jurisdictional 
consequences.” Therefore congressional intent serves as a bright line rule for allowing equitable tolling of 
a statute.  Because “filing deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules,” they should not be 
jurisdictional unless Congress has clearly indicated that the rule should be jurisdictional.  See Henderson 
ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011). 
134 See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2561.  The statute at issue in Brockamp, the Court reiterated, “set forth its 
time limitations in unusually emphatic form,” using “technical” language.  Id.  The Court reasoned that 
the AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not contain “unusually emphatic” language and that equitable 
tolling would not affect the substance of a habeas petitioner’s claim.  Id. 
135 Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136 Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2006). 
137 See Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007) 
23 
 
equitable tolling are relatively narrow, the judiciary at the very least has presented a petitioner who files 
an untimely application with an opportunity to set forth an argument in favor of equitable tolling. 
As mentioned, the Court in Holland made a threshold determination as to whether the statute of 
limitations at issue was “jurisdictional.” 138   The Court found the time period for filing a habeas petition 
was not “jurisdictional.”  After making that determination, it applied a rule which it had previously 
created providing a “rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling.”139  As discussed in Professor 
Smith’s article and in the subsequent case of Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, the Court may no 
longer find comfort with this label.140  The signal the Court sent in Henderson gives hope to tax litigants 
that some of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code may fall outside the “jurisdictional” label and 
allow equitable tolling. 
 
D. Administrative Responses 
 
The IRS offers a significant opportunity for resolving missed time periods under Procedural 
Regulation 301.9100-3.141  This provision allows taxpayers who fail to make a timely election to request 
relief upon a showing that “the taxpayer acted reasonably and in good faith, and the grant of relief will not 
prejudice the interests of the Government.”142  The regulation lists five circumstances that meet the 
criteria of reasonableness and good faith: 1) requesting relief before the IRS discovers the failure to 
timely make the regulatory election; 2) demonstrating that the failure resulted from intervening events 
beyond the taxpayer’s control; 3) demonstrating that the failure to make the election occurred because of 
the taxpayer’s failure to know of the necessity of the election despite exercising reasonable diligence; 4) 
the taxpayer’s reasonable reliance on written advice received from the IRS; or 5) the taxpayer’s 
reasonable reliance on a tax advisor who failed to make the election or to advise the taxpayer to do so.143 
The procedure for requesting Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3 relief requires the taxpayer to make the request 
using private letter ruling procedure.144  This creates transparency essentially identical to Section 
408(d)(3).  In the request, the taxpayer must show that the taxpayer acted reasonably and good faith under 
the factors listed in the regulation and that the IRS will not be prejudiced by the granting of the request.145  
The provisions adopted by the IRS to permit a taxpayer to obtain this form of equitable relief mirror other 
sections and cases allowing similar relief, and, in factor two add a broad catch-all for relief. 
Congress inserted equity into the Code in 1998 in the innocent spouse provision found in Section 
6015(f) and in the offer in compromise provision found in Section 7122.146  The innocent spouse 
                                                     
138 130 S. Ct. 2539, 2560 (2010) 
139 Id.  For a discussion of Holland’s application to tax cases involving equitable tolling, see Carlton M. 
Smith, Cracks Appear in the Code’s ‘Jurisdictional’ Time Provisions, TAX NOTES 511 (October 29, 2012). 
140 See id. at 517-520; Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202-1203. 
141 Treas. Reg. 301.9100-1 has provisions for automatic extensions to fix a missed election.  These 
provisions are not discussed here.  The relief provided in 9100-3 is available only for regulatory, not 
statutory time frames.  See generally Timothy J. Watt, Bennett Thrasher and Thomas L. Evans, 
Requesting 9100 Relief, The Tax Advisor, October 2008.  
 
142 Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3(a) 
143 Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3(b) 
144 Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3(e)(5) 
145 Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3(e)(1) 
146 Section 3201(a) of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (RRA), enacted section 6015, which provides relief in certain circumstances 
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provision did not address a time limitation but created a previously unavailable path to innocent spouse 
status.  Interestingly, time became the focus of litigation concerning this equitable provision.  For several 
years, taxpayers and the IRS fought about a time limitation for claiming equitable relief that the IRS 
imposed through it regulations.147  Ultimately, the IRS conceded the position taken in its regulation and 
announced its intention to withdraw the regulation.148 
Individuals claiming innocent spouse relief frequently have difficulty pressing their claims in a timely 
manner.  The nature of the relationship between certain spouses that creates the need for innocent spouse 
relief, e.g., domination, manipulation, domestic violence, also leaves the victim in need of such relief in a 
vulnerable financial and emotional state causing difficulty in meeting statutory time frames.  Over and 
over the cases litigating the IRS 6015(f) regulations painted the picture of a vulnerable population.149  
These individuals not only have trouble meeting the two year rule imposed in IRC 6015 (b) and (c) but 
also in meeting other time frames set out in the Code because of the issues surrounding their 
relationships. 
Mannella v. Commissioner provides a stark picture of the problems facing certain spouses.150  Mrs. 
Mannella missed the time frame established in the IRS regulations for submitting an innocent spouse 
claim because her former husband took the mail each day and refused to allow her to see it.151  While 
upholding the IRS regulation under IRC 6015(f), the Third Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court for 
a consideration of equitable tolling.152  Ultimately, the decision became moot before the Tax Court could 
consider equitable tolling because the IRS withdrew the application of the two-year rule.153   
                                                                                                                                                                           
from the joint and several liability imposed by section 6013(d)(3).  Section 3462 of the same act directed 
the IRS to create provisions for the allowance of an offer in circumstances in which the taxpayer had 
assets which could fully satisfy the outstanding liability but to do so would create economic hardship.  
See Treas. Reg. 301.7122-1(b)(3) and (c)(3).  The equitable provisions for offers in compromise do not 
relate to time frames and will not be discussed further. 
147 See Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010); Mannella v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 115 
(3d Cir. 2011); Jones v. Commissioner, 642 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 
148 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, provided the initial guidance regarding equitable relief from 
income tax liability under section 66(c) and section 6015(f) of the Internal Revenue Code. Both Revenue 
Procedure 2003-61, section 4.01(3) and Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) (TD 9003), required that the 
requesting spouse’s claim for equitable relief must be filed no later than two years after the date of the 
Service’s first collection activity. On July 25, 2011 the IRS withdrew its position on the two year rule in 
innocent spouse cases seeking equitable relief.  See Notice 2011-70.  On January 23, 2012, the IRS issued 
Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, withdrawing Rev. Proc. 2003-61, issuing new equitable factors and 
requesting comments.  The reversal resulted from the Commissioner’s decision to no longer pursue the 
litigation position that the two year period in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 and Treas. Reg. 1.6015-5(b)(1) correctly 
interpreted the statute despite the success of the IRS in the courts, see cases cited in footnote 142, 
defending efforts to strike down the regulation. 
149 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-16 (Jan. 20, 2011) (taxpayer suffered both 
physical and verbal abuse by her husband and faced threats of violence for refusing to sign documents); 
Brown v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 1249, 1255 (1988) (wife abused by her husband, forced to sign 
documents and yield to his demands). 
150 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011) 
151 See id. at [  ]. 
152 See id. at [  ]. 
153 See Notice 2011-70. 
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The circumstances in Mannella and in situations where domestic violence exists create a type of 
financial disability that needs to be recognized in crafting an equitable remedy for those missing time 
frames due to circumstances beyond their control.  Addressing this need requires a statute that does not 
limit financial disability to physical and mental impairment.  The IRS has administratively acknowledged 
the problem and is seeking to work with the bar to find language in its forms and guidance that will meet 
the needs of this group of taxpayers.154 
 
V. Crafting a Solution 
 
Congress’ approach to suspending statutory time frames in the Internal Revenue Code allows limited 
suspension in relatively narrow circumstances.  Each of the four statutory provisions discussed 
throughout the course of this Article that allow a time limitation suspension takes a different approach to 
the mechanism for granting the suspension.  The two individual specific sections, 6511(h) and 408, offer 
relief only of the time limitation within their respective Code sections and each takes a different approach 
on the criteria for granting suspension.  This section of the paper proposes a broad approach to the 
granting of relief when a financially disabled taxpayer misses a time period in the Internal Revenue Code.  
The authors believe that ad hoc sections addressing narrow circumstances do not serve the best interests 
of either taxpayers or the IRS.  A statutory solution provides a better mechanism for relief than entrusting 
courts with applying equitable tolling on a case by case basis.155 
To create a broad system for suspending time periods due to excusable circumstances, three issues 
require resolution.  First, the solution must have a sufficient breadth of the suspension.  Sections 7508 and 
7508A essentially allow suspension of any time frame in the Internal Revenue Code.  This very broad 
approach allows qualified taxpayers to attain relief in any circumstance provided they meet the 
established criteria.  Similarly, financial disability should apply to a wide range of time limitations.  
Second, an acceptable group of excusable circumstances must be identified.  The circumstances should be 
sufficiently broad to address all, or essentially all, situations in which relief should be granted.  The 
statutory solution will allow broader bases for relief than the current section 6511(h), drawing on Revenue 
Procedure 2003-7 and equitable tolling cases.  Third, the process of defining financial disability should 
include a mechanism that gives the IRS an opportunity to make the initial decision, subject to abuse of 
discretion review by the courts.  The IRS should have the authority to waive the time periods and 
taxpayers should be able to seek an administrative waiver in order to conserve valuable judicial resources, 
in the right cases, to avoid the courts. 
 
A. Breadth of suspension 
The legislative history of Section 7508 signifies Congress’ recognition of the sacrifices made by 
those serving in combat zones and the hardships those individuals face.  The purpose of Section 7508 
most concretely applicable to this article stem from the provision initially enacted in 1941; this statute, to 
reiterate the Tax Court’s language, recognized that performing certain acts under the Code were 
“impracticable or impossible” because of the war.156  Although the benefits afforded by this initial statute 
ended just a few years later with the end of World War II, Congress has repeatedly recognized the need to 
retain the suspension of limitations periods for individuals serving in or in support of the Armed Forces. 
                                                     
154 See T. Keith Fogg, “Low-Income Taxpayer Clinicians Meet with Service Representatives” Vol. 1, No. 
4, p. 16, ABA Section of Taxation News Quarterly Summer 2012. 
155 A statutory solution not only prevents a case by case equitable tolling fight but also gives the IRS the 
administrative ability to suspend statutory time frames.  This authority is not something that the IRS 
necessarily presumes that it has. 
156 Hamilton v. C.I.R., 13 T.C. 747, 750 (Nov. 14, 1949) (noting that the committee reports relating to 
Section 3804 were limited to this brief discussion). 
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Although Congress and the IRS have recognized a number of situations in which complying with a 
limitations period is “impracticable or impossible” for taxpayers, there has been no comprehensive reform 
or broadly applicable statute that accommodates the wide range of financial disability.157  For this reason, 
the breadth of Sections 7508 and 7508A is an attractive model for financial disability.  If the Internal 
Revenue Code or an IRS regulation sets a time frame, any taxpayer, not just individuals, subject to that 
time frame should have the right to show that the failure to meet the time frame stemmed from excusable 
circumstances as defined by Congress. 
Allowing the suspension to apply broadly, as Congress has done in section 7508 and 7508A frees the 
discussion to focus on the quality of the excuse for missing the time frame and not the nature of the time 
frame itself.  Perhaps certain time frames require more certainty but that does not mean that any time 
frame can stop a taxpayer from applying to act after the time frame if the excuse has sufficient merit.  
While we do not differentiate between the various provisions in the Internal Revenue Code setting time 
frames, Congress may decide to do so and require stronger proof in certain circumstances.  Late action by 
the taxpayer, even where the lateness has an excusable basis, does not mean that the excuse permitting the 
late action necessarily supports granting the underlying relief the taxpayer seeks.  It simply means that the 
time barrier for seeking the relief will be lifted if the taxpayer shows a sufficient basis for doing so. 
 
B. Excusable Circumstances 
Section 6511(h) provides a very narrow path to suspension of the time frame for filing a refund claim.  
The test under 6511(h) leaves out many of the traditional bases for relief provided in equitable tolling 
cases and compounds the narrowness in the statute with a Revenue Procedure that narrows relief even 
further with strict requirements that go too far in putting a burden on a taxpayer to comply – particularly 
low income taxpayers.  A better source of excusable circumstances exists in the legislative history of 408 
and in the Revenue Procedure enabling that statute.  The excusable circumstances found there should be 
supplemented with circumstances found in equitable tolling cases in order to provide a broad base of 
potential circumstances for the IRS to consider in deciding whether to allow a taxpayer to obtain an 
extended time frame.158  We recommend that Congress adopt a specific set of excusable circumstances 
and that it provide definition of those circumstances sufficient to guide the IRS in its application of the 
law. 
 
i. Bases for Relief 
Considering the sources described above, nine events deserve recognition as potential triggering 
events for the suspension of a time frame in the Internal Revenue Code: a) casualty, disaster, or other 
intervening events beyond the taxpayer’s control; b) mental incapacity; c) physical disability including 
hospitalization; d) death; e) misleading statement or guidance by IRS; f) breach of fiduciary duty; g) 
domestic or sexual abuse; and (h) diligent pursuit of litigation.  Each of the identified triggering events 
requires a brief explanation in support of its inclusion on the list.   
                                                     
157 Former Treasury Secretary Rubin also spoke of the need for a broad solution to the inequitable 
circumstances present in the Brockamp and Webb cases.  See Dep't of the Treas. News Release RR-955 
(March 20, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TNT 57-67.  See supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
158 These additional bases for relief also draw support from several of the bases for reasonable cause 
allowing the IRS to excuse late filing of a return or late payment of a liability, e.g., death, serious illness, 
erroneous advice from the IRS, fire, casualty natural disaster or other disturbance.  See DAVID 
RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON, & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 298-300 (2d ed. 2008).  
The granting to the IRS of the ability to excuse penalties for late filing and late payment for these bases 
adds symmetry to the granting of authority to the IRS to excuse other deadlines for action. 
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a. Disasters and other intervening events beyond the taxpayer’s control: Guidance from 
Sections 408(d)(3), 7508A and Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3 
While Section 7508A protects taxpayers who have the necessary nexus to a presidentially-
declared disaster area (including certain military and terrorist sites), individual disasters can pose similar 
or even greater barriers to meeting time frames posed by disasters of broad scope.  A home fire, sewer 
backup, burst pipe, and many other types of personal home disasters have the potential to prevent a 
taxpayer from meeting a necessary time frame.159  Rev. Proc. 2003-7 recognizes individual disaster as a 
possible triggering event for suspension of the time frame under section 408(d)(3)(I).  The procedural 
regulation recognizes that the broad category of intervening events beyond the taxpayer’s control can also 
create a circumstance deserving of relief.160   
b. Brockamp and Webb: Mental Incapacity 
The loss of mental capacity led to the first basis for individual relief of a statutory time frame in 
the Internal Revenue Code.  This basis deserves to remain on the list.  The circumstances of Mr. McGill 
and Mrs. Parsons demonstrate the devastating impact that mental incapacity can have on an individual’s 
ability to meet statutory time frames.  While the loss of mental capacity of Mr. McGill and Mrs. Parsons 
extended well beyond the twelve-month period required by Rev. Proc. 99-21, it is possible that mental 
incapacity could cause a taxpayer to miss a time frame even though it cannot be shown to last for twelve 
months.  The authors recommend that the taxpayer have the opportunity to show the impact of the loss of 
mental capacity without the requirement of the twelve month period.  Section 408(d)(3)(I), which does 
not require long time periods of disability in order to obtain relief, provides a more appropriate approach. 
c. Physical Disability 
Physical disability, including periods of hospitalization, combines a provision in section 6511(h) 
with a basis for relief provided in Rev. Proc. 2003-7, which implements section 408(d)(3)(I) .  The issue 
here is not whether a physical disability could impact a taxpayer’s ability to meet a time frame under the 
Internal Revenue Code but whether providing relief for a shorter period of disability is appropriate.  As 
with mental incapacity, the current provision in section 6511(h) limits relief for physical disability to 
those situations in which the taxpayer can demonstrate that the period of incapacity last at least twelve 
months.  That length of disability creates a barrier of inappropriate length.  The inclusion of 
hospitalization in Rev. Proc. 2003-7 signals the IRS’ willingness to accommodate a briefer and more 
appropriate time frame.  A taxpayer should still be required to demonstrate the physical disability caused 
the missed time period but should be allowed to demonstrate that without the burden of showing 
incapacity for such a long period.  Even a short period of incapacity, in certain circumstances, can have a 
devastating impact if it causes a taxpayer to miss an important time frame.  Rather than seeking to limit 
the relief to those with long-term disabling conditions, the focus here is on the disability itself and not the 
length of the disability.  The length of the disability may become relevant as the taxpayer seeks to prove 
the basis for missing the time frame but should not serve as general barrier.  Taxpayers with short period 
of incapacity are less likely to have someone appointed to act on their behalf and should be penalized 
because their incapacity does not last for at least one year or some other arbitrary time period not related 
to the deadline missed. 
d. Death: Section 408(d)’s Guidance 
Death is another basis for suspension allowed by section 408(d)(3)(I).  Death can cause 
significant disruption in the affairs of a taxpayer as a transition occurs between the decedent and the 
                                                     
159 See I.R.M. 20.1.1.3.2.5 which recognizes a fire, casualty, natural disaster, or other disturbance may 
constitute reasonable cause if the taxpayer exercised reasonable care but was unable to comply with tax 
obligations due to circumstances beyond their control. 
160 This type of relief could protect someone like Mrs. Mannella who might otherwise fail to qualify for 
relief under the provisions on this list. 
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executor.161  While the executor has a duty to step forward within a reasonable time to manage the affairs 
of the estate, it is possible that this transition could result in a missed time frame. For example, as 
illustrated by the above discussion of Davis v. United States, value determinations of a decedent’s assets 
may be subject to litigation that delays a taxpayer’s ability to comply with time limitations.162  The Code 
should acknowledge that possibility while keeping the requirement that the estate act with reasonable 
alacrity. 
e. IRS Misleading the Taxpayer Through its Statements or Conduct 
The case law governing equitable tolling recognizes tolling in situations in which the government 
misleads.163  This body of law supports including this basis in the list.164  Recognizing the ability of the 
IRS to mislead taxpayers, Congress enacted a provision that requires the IRS to list the last day to petition 
the Tax Court on statutory notices of deficiency.165  For taxpayers who rely on an inaccurate date on the 
notice, that provision grants them the benefit of the additional time period for filing a petition granted by 
the inaccurate date.166  This statute reflects the general rule in equitable tolling that providing misleading 
                                                     
161 I.R.M. 20.1.1.3.1.2.4 lists death as a basis for reasonable cause for abating a late filing or late payment 
penalty. 
162  Davis v. United States, 2011 WL 6294467 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011). 
163 See, e.g., Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1362-68 (Fed.Cir. 1998) (noting that if government misleads 
claimant into missing filing deadline, claimant may be entitled to equitable tolling of six-year statute of 
limitations to file complaint in Court of Federal Claims); Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 
1346 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (noting that equitable tolling of six-year statute of limitations would be allowed if 
government tricked plaintiff into missing filing deadline). 
164 Treas. Reg 301.6404-3 requires the IRS to abate the portion of a penalty attributable to erroneous 
written advice by an IRS employee if the advice is rendered pursuant to written request by the taxpayer 
that contained adequate and accurate information and the advice was reasonably relied upon by the 
taxpayer.  I.R.M. 20.1.1.3.2.4.2 allows the IRS to abate a penalty for reasonable cause if the taxpayer 
relies on the oral advice received from an IRS employee. 
165  Pub. L. 105-206, section 3463(b); IRC 6213(a) “Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before the 
last date specified for filing such petition by the Secretary in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as 
timely filed.” 
166 Service Center Advice 1998-036 (Released December 4, 1998) entitled “90-Day Letters -- Inconsistent 
Dates” provided that “[g]enerally, the time for filing a petition begins to run on the date of actual mailing, 
at least where the notice is undated or dated prior to the actual mailing date (Situation 1). See Hurst, 
Anthony & Watkins, 1 B.T.A. 26 (1924); United Telephone Co. v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 450 (1925). 
Courts have fixed the date of actual mailing variously -- as the date the notice is delivered to the post 
office, the date on the certified mailing list (Form 3877), or the postmark date.  See Traxler v. 
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 97 (1973).  It is now fairly settled that the relevant date is the postmark date, and 
that in the absence of the actual postmark, the best evidence is the certified mailing list.  See Coleman v. 
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 82, 91 (1990).”  This advice was issued immediately prior to the passage of Pub. 
L. 105-206 amending I.R.C. 6213(a) and requiring the IRS to place in the notice of deficiency the actual 
date by which the taxpayer must file a petition in the Tax Court for the petition to be timely.  This Service 
Center Advice and the cases cited in the advice discuss the situation in which the IRS misled taxpayers by 
failing to date the notice of deficiency or by dating it inconsistent with the date shown on the certified 
mailing record.  The courts addressing the issue adopted the certified mailing record as the “true” date of 
the mailing of the notice of deficiency and did not allow the IRS to gain an advantage by its mistake.  See 
also Lundy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-14.  After the change to IRC 6213(a) in 1998, it was still 
possible for the IRS to occasionally put the wrong date on the notice of deficiency as the last date for 
petitioning the Tax Court.  Chief Counsel, IRS has adopted the view most favorable to the taxpayer and 
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information should be associated with a basis for granting relief to the misled party.167  The number of 
these cases should be low and the bar for showing the IRS misled should be high, but the Government 
should accept responsibility when its own mistake prevents a taxpayer from meeting a required time 
frame. 
f. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Allowing a breach of fiduciary duty to extend the period for performing a duty allows taxpayers 
who fall prey to unscrupulous fiduciaries to have additional time to seek the correct tax result.  The loss of 
a time frame for acting due to the actions of a fiduciary most frequently occurs with minors or the very 
old.  Listing this as a triggering event allows minors to seek a remedy when they reach the age of 
majority.  It does not cause the IRS to grant substantive relief when it should not nor does it allow 
fiduciaries to escape liability where such liability exists.  Too often, however, the fiduciary that breached 
their duty has no ability to make the taxpayer whole.  If the IRS receives a windfall because of the actions 
or inactions of a fiduciary, the injured beneficiary should have the opportunity to come forward within a 
reasonable time of gaining capacity and learning of the missed deadline to seek relief. 
g. Domestic Abuse 
Victims of domestic and sexual abuse suffer in many ways.  The IRS has acknowledged the 
special problems caused by domestic abuse in granting relief under 6015(f) for equitable reasons.168  
Congress should recognize the possibility that domestic abuse could prevent a taxpayer from meeting a 
federal tax deadline other than simply the deadline to request innocent spouse relief.  As the Third Circuit 
noted in its remand of the Mannella case, the taxpayer’s circumstances could justify equitable tolling.  In 
circumstances in which the taxpayer can show that domestic abuse prevented him or her from meeting 
time frames, those periods should be suspended. 
h. Diligent Pursuit of Litigation 
Taxpayers should be entitled to tolling during the period in which litigation or an administrative 
determination is pending, so long as the taxpayer is in diligent pursuit of such litigation.  Congress has 
allowed tolling for the pendency of properly filed post-conviction relief in the context of habeas 
petitioners, discussed above.  To reiterate the case of the unfortunate taxpayer in Davis, a taxpayer may be 
unable to file a refund claim or file suit prior to a court’s resolution of an underlying issue.169  Because 
litigation is often costly and time-consuming for taxpayers, they should receive the benefit of statutory 
tolling for the period of pending judicial or administrative determinations. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the one that kept the IRS from benefiting from mistakes in setting out the date on the notice of deficiency. 
See I.R.M. 35.3.2.3 (09-21-2012), “Timeliness of Petition” (“Section 3463(a) of RRA 98 provides that 
the Service shall include on each notice of deficiency the date determined by the Secretary as the last day 
on which the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court. Even if the date listed on the notice of 
deficiency for the last day to file is incorrect and allows more than the statutory 90 or 150 day period to 
timely file a petition, a petition mailed to the Tax Court on or before the date listed on the notice will 
nevertheless be deemed timely.”). 
 
167 See supra note 157, listing cases in which court has held that equitable tolling applies where 
government misleads. 
168 Notice 2012-8 “Significantly, this proposed revenue procedure expands how the IRS will take into 
account abuse and financial control by the nonrequesting spouse in determining whether equitable relief is 
warranted. Review of the innocent spouse program demonstrated that when a requesting spouse has been 
abused by the nonrequesting spouse, the requesting spouse may not have been able to challenge the 
treatment of any items on the joint return, question the payment of the taxes reported as due on the joint 
return, or challenge the nonrequesting spouse’s assurance regarding the payment of the taxes.” 
169 See Davis, 2011 WL 6294467 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011); see also Haas v. United States, __ Fed. Cl. 
__, 2012 WL 4320652 (2012) (taxpayer’s refund claims dismissed as untimely despite his ongoing 
pursuit with Department of Veterans Affairs of disability determination). 
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These eight excusable circumstances seek to capture the range of circumstances for which Congress 
should give taxpayers a second chance after missing a time frame.  They are based on circumstances 
already identified by Congress in the tax code or circumstances identified by the courts in equitable 
tolling cases.  Undoubtedly, additional circumstances exist and debate exists over allowing a second 
chance for some of these circumstances.  
 
ii. Standards for Testing Bases for Relief 
The IRS, and the courts, needs reasonable and administrable standards to apply when a taxpayer 
seeks the suspension of a time frame missed as the alleged result of a qualifying basis for relief.  The very 
technical medical report required by Revenue Procedure 99-21 provides one model for the type of 
standard Congress might apply in selecting a standard for relief.  Having a quantifiable standard and 
requiring a taxpayer seeking relief to meet that standard is reasonable and aids the IRS in administering a 
provision that has the possibility of opening a Pandora’s Box of unfinished business.  The goal is to strike 
the right balance between a sufficiently measurable standard and recognizing the difficulty that some 
worthy taxpayers will encounter in providing proof if the standard is too difficult. 
The type of medical report required in Revenue Procedure 99-21 places a heavy burden on the 
taxpayer to procure magic words from a physician.  The standard created can deny a taxpayer relief if the 
expert cannot opine on the taxpayer’s condition in a sufficiently specific manner.  Rather than focus on 
the specific language of the expert, whether it is a medical opinion or the circumstance of domestic 
violence, the standard should take an approach focused on gathering the facts and applying those facts to 
the basis for relief.  The IRS should not require the taxpayer to provide reports with specific language, but 
should focus on what the taxpayer must prove and then make a decision based on the evidence provided 
to establish the excusable circumstance. 
With respect to each of the eight excusable circumstances the Service should provide guidance of 
what a taxpayer must prove to show both the existence of an allowable excuse and the length of the 
excused circumstances.  The guidance should further provide assistance explaining how the taxpayer 
might make that proof but without the type of specificity detailing what an expert report must say.  The 
taxpayer then must do their best to provide adequate proof and not submit expert or other opinions that 
fail to address the specifics needed to show a basis for excusing the lateness of the submission at issue.  
Both the case law in equitable tolling and Revenue Procedure 2003-7 appear to take this broader 
approach foregoing the narrow, check the box approach of Revenue procedure 99-21.170  By viewing all 
of the circumstances, as developed through the submission of the taxpayer in support of the application of 
the excusable circumstance, the IRS and the court reviewing the decision of the IRS create the greatest 
opportunity for a fair result. 
 
iii. Mechanism for Granting Relief 
The existing statutes in the Internal Revenue Code each have different mechanisms for relief.  An 
initial concern with Section 6511(h)’s process is that it allows the IRS office receiving a claim for refund 
to make a decision concerning relief in a non-transparent way.  If the IRS receiving office or appeals 
office determines that a taxpayer meets the criteria of 6511(h) as elaborated in Revenue Procedure 99-21, 
then no one knows about the allowance other than the taxpayer and the IRS.  The only cases making their 
way into the public eye involve disputes between the IRS and the taxpayer over the application of the 
                                                     
170 Even one case deciding the application of Rev. Proc. 99-21 permitted an opportunity beyond the 
narrow language of the revenue procedure.  See Bowman v. IRS, 2010 WL 2991712 at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 
29, 2010) (holding that technically deficient physician's statement can be cured by supplemental 
physician statements to comply with Revenue Procedure 99-21; unfortunately, the taxpayer failed to cure 
the defect within the time permitted by the court). 
31 
 
relief provision.  The process of denying a claim for refund as untimely allows for judicial review of the 
IRS’ decision but does not make public those decisions in which the taxpayer does not seek relief through 
the judicial system.  As evidenced by the cases taken to court, most courts engaging in this review have 
given significant deference to Rev. Proc. 99-21 and the conclusion of the IRS in applying the rules set out 
in this guidance.171  It is not possible, however, to get a good sense of the circumstances in which the IRS 
has determined the taxpayer meets the statute’s requirements and administratively treated an otherwise 
late claim as timely. 
Section 408(d)(3)(I) provides a transparent but arguably more cumbersome procedure based on 
the private letter ruling process.  Taxpayers seeking relief from the sixty day rule must submit themselves 
to this process.  Similar to meeting the requirements to establish financial disability contained in Revenue 
Procedure 99-21, private letter ruling presents challenges for pro se taxpayers who may not fully 
understand the procedures necessary to meet the submission process.  Obtaining a private letter ruling, 
however, does allow a transparent view of agency decision making and provide guidance to others 
seeking similar relief.  A system which provides transparency at the administrative decision making level 
better equips taxpayers and their representatives to evaluate when they should seek relief based on 
excusable circumstances. 
Section 7508 relies upon a statutory definition that looks to decisions by persons outside the IRS 
to provide guidance on who receives relief.  The determination of both combat zone and qualifying 
individual within a combat zone is made by Congress, the President, or the Defense Department.  While 
the taxpayer and the IRS may have some discussions concerning the proof that the taxpayer or the place 
meets the required definition, the process is essentially transparent regarding Congress’ grant of relief.  
The IRS’ role is one of verification and not determination.  The verification role is not transparent at the 
administrative level. 
Section 7508A in many ways places the greatest burden on the IRS because Congress has 
delegated to the IRS broad authority to make decisions concerning the scope of relief granted.  The relief 
here is granted on a broad basis and a very transparent basis through the issuance of public notices.  The 
IRS, in addition to its role as decision maker on the scope of relief, has a role to play concerning 
verification of a taxpayer’s claim that the taxpayer fits the publicly granted basis for relief.  Once again 
the verification role is not transparent at the administrative level. 
Adopting a mechanism for relief for a new provision should consider the existing procedures, in 
addition to other review mechanisms for granting relief to taxpayers.  Revenue Procedure 99-21 sets up a 
procedure that operates within existing IRS claims review procedures.  It has the advantage of using 
decision makers at the IRS familiar with the refund claims as well as a process familiar with those 
claiming refunds.  Because this system lacks transparency, however, it does not provide much 
information to other applicants about the likelihood of relief.   
Rev. Proc. 2003-7 established a private letter ruling process where none existed previously.  The 
private letter ruling process has issued a large number of rulings in the decade since the process was 
adopted.172  The number of rulings allows others seeking relief to see the IRS’ analysis in processing 
requests providing the type of transparency that aids practitioners and taxpayers in deciding whether their 
circumstances merit an application for relief.  Because of the fee associated with obtaining these rulings, 
the private letter ruling process also imposes a cost on the taxpayer applying for relief.173  Perhaps, 
                                                     
171 See supra note 71, citing cases in which courts have granted significant deference to the requirements 
set forth in Rev. Proc. 99-21. 
172 A search for private letters rulings issued pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2003-7 found that the IRS has made 
almost 800 rulings in the past decade which amounts to about 65 private letter rulings each year on this 
issue. 
173 For private letter rulings, the fee list the IRS publishes near the beginning of each year is calculated in 
accordance with OMB Circular No. A-25.  See Rev. Proc. 2012-1, Section 15, Appendix A (listing most 
fees in range of $625 to $11,500).  Automatic and simplified methods are generally not subject to a user 
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charging a fee for a determination of relief for an untimely action best serves the system.  If a fee system 
exists, it must provide relief for low income taxpayers for whom the fee itself may serve as a barrier.174  
In addition to the fee, the private letter ruling process is a formal and technical process not particularly 
well-suited to the needs of low income taxpayers. 
Congress has created two procedures that have less formality than the private letter ruling process 
that allow an administrative appeal and provide for a review of the IRS determination by the Tax Court: 
the Innocent Spouse provisions and Collection Due Process.  These processes both generally involve low 
income taxpayers, unlike the private letter ruling process.   Both of those procedures could serve as 
models for a process to review requests for relief based on excusable circumstances for missing a 
deadline.  The IRS could set up a special unit for processing relief requests based on the defined 
excusable circumstances and provide an administrative appeal of the initial determination, as with 
Innocent Spouse.175  Alternatively, it could allow the unit making the underlying determination on the tax 
matter to make the initial determination regarding the request for relief based on excusable circumstances 
and then provide an appeal of the decision of initial unit similar to the structure of Collection Due 
Process.176  In either case, the Appeals Office could issue a determination which, if unfavorable to the 
taxpayer, could result in a ticket to Tax Court for a review of the determination.  To make the process 
more transparent, the process could include a publication of determinations by appeals similar to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
fee.  For an offer in compromise the fee is $150, unless the taxpayer is a low income taxpayer meeting the 
fee waiver requirement.  See Internal Revenue Service, Offer in Compromise, 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Offer-in-Compromise-1 (specifying that completed offer packing will 
include $150 non-refundable application fee).  For an installment agreement, the fees are set forth in IR-
2006-196, Dec. 28, 2006.  The news release noted that in accordance with the Office of Management and 
Budget’s direction for federal agencies to charge user fees “reflecting the full cost of goods or services 
that convey special benefits,” the fees were going to increase in 2007.  See Internal Revenue Service, 
“IRS Announces Installment Agreement User Fee Increases for Some Taxpayers,” (Dec. 28, 2006) (“User 
fees for entering into a non-direct debit installment agreement will increase from $43 to $105, and the fee 
for direct debit installment agreements will increase from $43 to $52.”).  The United States Tax Court has 
produced a standard form for requesting permission of the Court to waive the filing fee.  The Tax Court 
form is “Application for Waiver of Filing Fee and Affidavit.”  The Court routinely grants these requests.  
The form is available at the Tax Court web site.  See 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/forms/Application_for_Waiver_of_Filing_Fee.pdf. 
 
174 The fee waiver that exists for the application for an offer in compromise and for the Tax Court filing 
fee as well as the fee reduction that exists for installment agreement requests does not have a parallel in 
requests for private letter rulings. 
175 I.R.M. 4.11.34.3.1 (12-15-2004) (“Receipt of Innocent Spouse Claim to be Worked at the Centralized 
Site”). 
176 For collection due process cases, one centralized site does not exist.  The correspondence giving the 
taxpayer the appeals rights informs the taxpayer of the location for sending the collection due process 
request for appeal.  See I.R.M. 5.1.9.3.2 (02-23-2012) (providing directions for taxpayer submission of 
CDP hearing request).  A taxpayer must either send or deliver the CDP hearing request to the IRS office 
and address as directed on the CDP notice. If the CDP notice does not list such address, the taxpayer 
should call a toll-free number to obtain the address.  The taxpayer may also deliver the request to the local 
taxpayer assistance center within the thirty-day period.  See id. 
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process of the publication of accepted offers in compromise.177  Either of these processes is simpler for 
low income taxpayers, and other taxpayers as well, than the private letter ruling process. 
We recommend a process similar to the Innocent Spouse determination process: the taxpayer 
should first have the opportunity to make an administrative appeal, followed by the opportunity for a Tax 
Court hearing on the determination by appeals using the abuse of discretion standard.  The administrative 
determinations should be made public through an online system, in order to provide guidance to similarly 
situated taxpayers.  Additionally, taxpayers seeking review should pay a relative high fee which would be 
waived for qualifying low income taxpayers.178 
  
VI. Conclusion 
 
Congress has expressed concern for individuals and entities that miss time frames required under 
the Internal Revenue Code.  Yet, it has only done so in limited circumstances.  More than twenty years 
have passed since the Supreme Court said that equitable tolling applies to federal statutes.  Perhaps it was 
an unlucky stroke of timing that the first statute litigating under the Internal Revenue Code after the Irwin 
case was the refund statute with its many rules.  Despite the setback in Brockamp, however, the push to 
extend equitable tolling to the Code is a reality that will not disappear without a much stronger statement 
by the Supreme Court concerning the exceptional nature of tax laws.  Without broad legislation providing 
guidance in this area, the prospect of many years of litigation exists as parties seek to carve out portions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Given its acknowledgement of the role of equitable circumstances in certain, so far limited, 
circumstances, Congress should look to get ahead of the litigation and set broad parameters for the 
application of principles that would allow a taxpayer to extend a time period for performance.  By adding 
a broad provision to the Internal Revenue Code, Congress could eliminate much unnecessary litigation 
concerning the application of equitable tolling and control the discussion on its own terms.  It could also 
move away from the narrow case driving type of relief reflected in IRC 6511(h) to the broader type of 
equitable relief perhaps envisioned by Treasury Secretary Rubin.  This type of relief only gives deserving 
taxpayers the opportunity for success on the merits and promotes fairness in the tax system that aids in 
overall compliance.  In creating a broader system not dependent on the bringing equitable tolling cases in 
court or stiff administrative barriers in applying through the IRS, Congress can also apply the knowledge 
it has gained through some of the provisions passed in the 1998 Reform Act and craft a system that serves 
all taxpayers and not just those with funds to purchase the full measure of justice. 
                                                     
177 See I.R.C. §6103(k)(1) (providing for public inspection of certain offers in compromise); I.R.M. 
11.3.11.8 (06-30-2009) (“Public Inspection of Accepted Offers-in-Compromise”).  Treas. Reg. 
601.702(d)(8) requires that Form 7249 “Offer Acceptance Report” for each accepted offer in compromise 
with respect to any liability for tax imposed by the IRC will be available for inspection and copying. 
Applicable Forms 7249 will be available for one year from the date of execution and the file will be 
maintained so that it is readily available for examination by the public. See I.R.M. 5.8.8.6 (Acceptance 
Processing).  Treas. Regs. 301.7122-1 and 601.702(d)(8) also provide guidance for inspection for offers 
in compromise matters. 
 
178 The authors recommend charging a fee of $1,000 or more to reflect the cost to the IRS but would 
consider allowing it to be returned to taxpayers whose determinations were favorable.  While this puts the 
IRS in a position where it could be accused of disallowing a favorable determination in order to keep the 
fee, the IRS would not make its decisions on such a basis and credible accusations of that type behavior 
would be extremely rare. 
